UNO' LIBRAE r GRB^M^IAMPA STACKS CENTRAL CIRCULATION BOOKSTACKS The person charging this material is re- sponsible for its renewal or its return to the library from which it was borrowed on or before the Latest Dote stamped below You may be charged a minimum fee of $75.00 for each lost book. I noi i/ w**" _ for dtoelplinary cHo "d nr rwylt the TO ^fcfc ^i Of ILUHO.S UHMT AT UUANA^AMTAION OCT 1 2 1997 When renewing by phone, write new due date below previous due date. L162 LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION BY GEOEG WILHELM FEIEDRICH HEGEL ""KOJi TRANSLATED FROM THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION BY THE REV. E. B. SPEIRS, B.D., AND J. BURDON SANDERSON THE TRANSLATION EDITED BY THE REV. E. B. SPEIRS, B.D. IN THREE VOLUMES VOL. II. LONDON KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER, & CO. PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHAKJNG CROSS ROAD 1895 The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved. Printed by BALLANTYNR, HANSON & Co. At the Ballantyne Press : E v . CONTENTS PART II PAOE DEFINITE RELIGION continued 1-323 FIRST DIVISION THE RELIGION OF NATURE continued 1-65 II. The division of consciousness within itself continued. 2. The religion of imagination or phantasy -. . 1-47 a. Its conception i 6. The general idea of the objective content of this stage . . . , . . . .11 c. Worship or cultus 30 3. The religion of Being-within-self . . . 48-65 a. Its conception . . . . . . 48 b. The historical existence of this religion . . 49 c. Worship or cultus 59 III. The religion of nature in transition to the religion of freedom 65-122 1. The religion of the Good, or of light . . 70-82 a. Its conception 70 b. This religion as it actually exists ... 77 c. Worship or cultus .82 2. The Syrian religion, or the religion of pain . 82-85 3. The religion of mystery .... 85-122 a. The characterisation of the conception or notion of this stage 88 b. The concrete idea belonging to this stage . . 101 c. Worship or cultus . . . . . .109 CONTENTS SECOND DIVISION PAGE 122 THE RELIGION OF SPIRITUAL INDIVIDUALITY A The transition, to the sphere of spiritual indi- 123 viduality . B. The metaphysical conception or noti sphere . a. The conception of the One 140 b. Necessity . i .140 c. Conformity to an end , . . . 1 00 C The division of the subject . 170-219 I The religion of sublimity . ' A The general nature of its conception or notion B The concrete general idea or popular conceptic a. The determination of the divine particu tion . b. The form of the world . c The end God works out in the world . 205 C Worship or cultus The transition to the stage which follows 224-288 II. The religion of beauty A. The general conception or notion B The outward form of the Divine . ' a The conflict of the spiritual and the natural . 229 239 b. Formless necessity . r Posited necessity or the particular gods 243 n. 256 C. Worship or cultus a Inner feeling . 267 6. Worship as service . c Service as reconciliation . III. The religion of utility or of the Understanding A. The general conception of this stage . B. This religion as the Roman religion . 0. Worship or cultus . CONTENTS PART III PAGE THE ABSOLUTE KELIGION 327 A. The general aspects of this religion . . . 328 1. The revealed religion 328 2. The revealed religion known as revealed . -335 3. The religion of truth and freedom . . . 346 B. The metaphysical notion or conception of the Idea of God 348 THE PHILOSOPHY OF KELIGION PART II DEFINITE RELIGION II THE DIVISION OF CONSCIOUSNESS WITHIN ITSELF (continued") 2. The, Religion of Imagination or Phantasy. (a.) Its Conception. The second of the main forms of Pantheism, when this latter actually appears as religion, is still within the sphere of this same principle of the One substantial Power, in which all that we see around us, and even the freedom of man itself, has merely a negative, accidental character. We saw that the substantial Power, in its first form, comes to be known as representing the multi- tude of esssential determinations, and the entire sphere of these, and not as being in its own self spiritual. And now the question immediately arises as to how this Power is itself determined, and what is its content ? Self-consciousness in religion cannot, like the abstract thinking understanding, limit itself to the idea of that Power known only as an aggregate of determinations which merely are. In this way the Power is not as yet known as real, as independently existing unity ; not as yet as a Principle. Now the opposite form of this VOL. II. A 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION determination is the taking back of the manifold deter- minateness of existence into the unity of inner self determination. This concentration of self-deterrnmatio] contains the beginning of Spirituality. I The Universal, as determining its own self, and not merely as a multitude of rules, is Thought, exists as Thought It is in our thoughts alone that Nature, the rulin Power which brings forth everything, ex 18 ts as the Universal, as this One Essence, as this One Power which exists for itself. What we have before us in Nature is this Universal, but not as a Universal, is in our thought that the truth of Nature is brought into prominence on its own account as Idea, or more abstractly as something having a universal character. Universality is, however, in its very nature Thought, and as self-determining is the source of all determina- tion But at the stage at which we now are, and where the Universal appears for the first time as the determining a^nt as a Principle, it is not as yet Spirit, but abstract Universality generally. The Universal being known in this way as Thought, it remains as such shut up within itself. " It is the source of all power, but does not externalise or make itself manifest as such. 2 Now to Spirit belongs the power of differentiation and the full development of the difference. Of the systeni of this complete development, the concrete unfolding of Thoucrht on its own account, and that particular unfolding which as manifestation or appearance is Nature and the spiritual world, form an inherent part. Since, however, the Principle which makes its appearance at the present sta-e has not as yet got so far as to permit of this untbldin" taking place within that principle itself, it bein" rather held fast in simple abstract concentration only the unfolding, the fulness of the actual Idea, is found outside of the Principle, and consequently d]rTeren- tiation and manifoldness are abandoned to the wildest, most outward forms of imagination. The specialisa- DEFINITE RELIGION 3 tion of the Universal manifests itself iu a multitude of independent powers. 3. This multiplicity, this wild abandonment, is once more taken back into the original unity. This taking back, this concentration of thought, would complete the moment of spirituality so far as the Idea is concerned, if the original universal thought resolved within its own self upon differentiation, and if it were known as essen- tially this act of taking back. Upon the basis of abstract thought, however, the taking back itself remains a process devoid of Spirit. There is nothing wanting here, so far as the moments of the Idea of Spirit are con- cerned, the Idea of rationality is present in this advance. But yet those moments do not constitute Spirit ; the unfolding does not give itself the perfect form of Spirit, because the determinations remain merely universal. There is merely a continual return to that Universality which is self-active, but which is held fast in the abstraction of self-determination. We have thus the abstract One and the wildness of extravagant ima^ina- O O tion, which, it is true, is recognised in turn as remaining in identity with what is primary, but is not expanded into the concrete unity of the Spiritual. The unity of the intelligible realm reaches the condition of particular independent existence ; this last does not, however, be- come absolutely free, but remains confined within universal Substance. But just because the unfolding does not as yet return in a true way into the Notion, is not as yet taken back into the Notion by its own inner action, it still retains its immediacy in spite of that return, still belongs to natural religion, and therefore the moments full apart, and are kept independent and separate relatively to one another. This is the curse of nature. Everywhere we shall find tones that accord with the Notion, with the True, which, however, become the more horrible in the strain as a whole because they continue to retain the 4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION character of separateness or mutual exclusion, and because the moments, being independent and objective in their particularity, are looked upon theoretically. The further question which now presents itself is, What are the forms, the shapes in which this indepen- dence appears ? We are actually in such a world, con- sciousness finds itself in an existing world, of such a mutually exclusive character in a world of sense, and thus has to deal with a world of many-coloured manifold- ness. Taking it as a whole, it is thus just " these," these individual things ; that is the fundamental determination here. We call "these," Things, and this is the more precise characteristic we assign to the Objective, and by which we distinguish it from Spirit. In a similar way we have in inner life to do with manifold forces, spiri- tual distinctions and experiences, which the understand- ing in like manner isolates; as, for example, this incli- nation, that passion, this power of memory, that power of judgment, &c. In thinking, too, we have determina- tions each of which exists for itself, such as positive, nega- tive, being, not-being ; this, for our consciousness, which takes things in their sensuous aspect, for our understand- ing, is independence. In this way we have a view or theory of the universe which is of a prosaic character, because the independence has the form of what is a thing, of forces, faculties of the mind, &c., and conse- quently its form is abstract. The thought is not Eeason here, but Understanding, and is present in that form. But when we so regard the world, what we have is the reflection of understanding, which appears much later, and cannot as yet exist here. Not until prose, not until thinking, has permeated all relations, so that man every- where assumes the attitude of one who thinks abstractly, does he speak of external things. The thinking in ques- tion here is, on the contrary, this Substance only ; it is merely this self-containedness or being at home with self ; it is not as yet brought into exercise, not applied DEFINITE RELIGION 5 thought, and has not as yet permeated the entire man. The special Powers, which are partly objects, such as the sun, mountains, rivers, or else are more abstract ideas, such as origination, decay, change, assumption of form, and the like, are not as yet taken up into Spirit, are not as yet truly posited as ideal, and yet at the same time, too, are not as yet intelligently distinguished by the understanding from Spirit, and pure Being is still concentrated in that undeveloped state of Substance which is not as yet spiri- tual Substance. Now we do not only say things " are" but we add in the second place that they stand in manifold relation to one another ; they have causal connection, they are de- pendent on one another : this second moment of the action of understanding cannot be present here. It is the understanding only as pure self-identity, or as a self- consistent process, which conceives of objects under these categories. " Since the one is, therefore the other is," is its way of speaking; and without once turning back, ic carries ihis chain of connection continuously on into the bad or false infinite. Thus the independence we are speaking of has not this form. The form of indepen- dence which is present here is no other than the form of that which is the form of concrete self-consciousness itself, and this first mode is therefore the human or ani- mal mode. At this stage there is a filling-up ; the con- crete makes its appearance as existent, as something which is actually perceived, no longer as Power. In this last the Concrete is posited as merely negative, as in subjection to the Power ; it is only the practical element which is objective in the Power, not the theoretical. Here, on the contrary, the theoretical element is set free. Spirit, as being theoretical, has a double aspect. It relates itself as within itself to itself, and it relates itself to the Things, which " things " are for it universal independence. Thus for Spirit the things themselves break up into their immediate external varied form on 6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION the one hand, and into their free independently existing Essence on the other. Since this is not as yet a Thing, nor represents, in fact, the categories of the Understand- ing, and is not abstract independence produced by thought, it is the free independence of ordinary conception ; and this is the idea formed of man, or at least of what has life, which consequently may be, in a general sense, called the Objectivity of Imagination. In order to conceive of the sun, the sky, a tree as existing, as self-sustained, it is only necessary for us to have a sensuous picture or image of it, to which nothing which appears heterogeneous has to be added in order that it may be thus presented to us as self-sustained or independent. But show or semblance is a deception. The image, when represented to us as inde- pendent, as having Being, and when regarded by us as such, has for us just the character of Being, of a force, of a causality, of a form of activity, of a soul ; it is in these categories that it has its independence. But in so far as the independence has not as yet advanced to the prose of Understanding, for which the category of force or of cause is the characteristic quality of objectivity generally, the apprehension and expression of that independence is this poetry, which makes the idea of human nature and out- ward form the supporting basis and Essence of the external world, or, it may be, even animal form, or the human form in combination with the animal. This poetry is, in fact, the rational element in imagination, for this rational ele- ment is to be kept firm hold of, although consciousness, as before stated, has not yet advanced to the category, and thus the element of independence is to be taken out of the world which is around us, and, in fact, in direct contrast to what is not independent, to what is conceived as ex- ternal. And here it is animal and human existence alone which is the form, mode, and nature of what is free among things. The sun, the sea, a tree, and the like, are, as a matter of fact, without independence as compared with what lives and is free ; and it is these forms of indepen- DEFINITE RELIGION .7 dence which in this element of independent existence constitute the supports of the category for any content at all. A subjective soul is thus given to Matter, which, however, is not a category, but is concrete Spirituality and Life. The immediate result is that as soon as objects gene- rally and universal thought-determinations have this free independence, that connection of things in the world which is the work of understanding is dissolved; it is the categories of the relations of necessity, or the depen- dence of things upon one another in accordance with their quality, their essential definite character, which form this connection ; all these categories, however, are absent, and thus nature, with nothing to support or give it stability, reels at the mercy of imagination. There may be any sort of unregulated fancy, any kind of chance occurrence and result ; the movement in connection with any condition of things is not bound and limited by any- thing whatever; the whole splendour of nature and of imagination is available as a means of decorating the content, and the caprice of imagination has absolutely unbounded scope, and can follow whatever direction it pleases. Passion in its natural untrained state possesses but few interests, and that in which it has an interest it negates, while on the other hand it pays no attention to whatever is void of interest. From this standpoint of imagination, however, all distinctions are taken special notice of and firmly clung to, and everything whicli has an interest for imagination becomes free, independent, and is exalted to the rank of fundamental thought. But it is likewise owing to this very imagined inde- pendence itself that conversely the peculiar position of the content and of the definite outward forms disappears; for since they have a definite finite content, they would properly have their objective support, their return and abiding renewal, only in that connection of the under- 8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION standing which has vanished, and by means of which their independence, instead of being a reality, becomes rather a complete contingency. The phenomenal world, the world of appearance, is therefore drawn into the ser- vice of imagination. The divine world is a realm of imagination, which becomes all the more infinite and manifold as it has its home in a region where Nature is exuberant ; and this principle of passionless imagination, of a fancy built on a theoretical foundation, has enriched the character of the mind and its emotions, emotions which in this gently hatching warmth are permeated in a pre-eminent degree by a strain of voluptuous and sweet loveliness, but at the same time of feeble softness. The objective content, too, is not apprehended here in the form of Beauty : those powers, whether general natural objects or the forces of individual feeling, as, for example, love, are not as yet embodied in forms of beauty. To beauty of form belongs free subjectivity, which in the sensuous world and in concrete existence is both free and knows itself to be so. For the Beautiful is essentially the Spiritual making itself known sensuously, presenting itself in sensuous concrete existence, but in such a manner that that existence is wholly and entirely permeated by the Spiritual, so that the sensuous is not independent, but has its meaning solely and exclusively in the Spiritual and through the Spiritual, and exhibits not itself, but the Spiritual. Such is true beauty. In living human beings there are many external influences which check pure idealisa- tion, this subsumption of the bodily sensuous element under the Spiritual. Here this condition does not as yet exist, and for this reason, that the Spiritual is as yet only present in this abstract shape of Substantiality. It is, indeed, unfolded into these particular forms, into special Powers, but the substantiality still exists for itself; it has not per- DEFINITE RELIGION 9 nieated and overcome these its particular shapes, this sensuous concrete existence. Substance is, so to speak, an universal space which has not as yet organised, idealised, and brought under it that with which it is filled up the particularisation which issued from it. For this reason, too, the form of beauty cannot be created here, because the content these particularisa- tions of Substance is not as yet the true content of Spirit. Since, then, the limited content is the foundation, and is known as spiritual, the subject this definite spiritual agent becomes, owing to this, an empty form. In the Religion of Beauty, the Spiritual, as such, constitutes the foundation, so that the content, too, is the spiritual content. In that religion, statues or pictures, as sensuous ^ A(*A matter, are merely the expression of the Spiritual. Here, however, the content is not of a spiritual kind. Thus, the art we find here is symbolical art, which does indeed express essential characteristics, but not characteristics of the Spiritual. Hence the uubeautiful, the mad, the fantastic character of the art which makes its appearance here. The symbolism is not the purely Beautiful, just because a content other than spiritual individuality is the basis. Free subjectivity is not the permeating element, and is not essentially expressed by the form. In this phantasy there is nothing fixed, nothing moulds itself into forms of the beauty which is given only by the consciousness of freedom. Speaking generally, what we have here is complete dissolution of form, the restless movement, the manifestation of the self-importance of the individual. Devoid of anything to give it stability, the inner element passes over into external existence, and the unfolding of the Absolute a process which outdoes itself in this world of imagination is merely an endless breaking-up of the One into the Many, and an unstable reeling to and fro of all content. io THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION It is the s} T stem of universal fundamental determina- tions, the system determined in and for itself through the Notion, as that of the absolute sovereign powers to which everything returns, and which permeate every- thing through and through, which alone brings thorough stability into this region of caprice, confusion, and feebleness, into this measureless splendour and enerva- tion. And it is the study of this system which is of the most essential moment. On the one hand, we have to recognise the presence of these determinations through the perverted sensuous form of the capricious, externally determined embodiment, and to do justice to the essential element which lies at their foundation ; and on the other hand, we have to observe the degradation which they xmdergo. This degradation is partly owing to the mode in which the indifference of those determinations toward one another appears, partly owing to the presence of arbitrary human and externally local sense experience, through which they are transposed into the sphere of the every-day life, where all passions, local features features of individual recollection are joined on to them. There is no act of judgment, no feeling of shame, nothing of the higher mutual fitness of form and of content ; the every-day existence as such is not made to vanish, and is not developed into beauty. The inequality or dispro- portion of form and content consist?, more strictly speak- ing, in this that the fundamental determinations aie debased, inasmuch as they acquire the semblance of being similar to the disconnected facts of existence, and that conversely the external sensuous representation becomes depraved by means of its form. From what has now been stated it will be already clear that these determinations of the divine Essence have their existence in the Indian religion. We have here to look away from its vast and characteristically endless mythology and mythological forms, in order to keep to the principal fundamental determinations alone, DEFINITE RELIGION n which are on the one hand baroque and wild, and are horrible, repulsive, loathsome distortions, but at the same time prove themselves to have the Notion for their inner source; while in virtue. of the development which it gets in this theoretical region, they recall the highest element of the Idea. At the same time, however, they express that definite stuntedness under which the Idea suffers when these fundamental determinations are not brought back again into their spiritual nature. What constitutes the principal point of interest in this religion of India is the development or explication of form in contrast with an abstract monotheistic re- ligion, and so too with the Greek religion that is to say, in contrast with a religion which has spiritual indi- viduality as its principle. (b.) The general idea of the objective content of this stage. What is the first in the Notion, what is true, the universal substantial element, is the eternal repose of Being- within-itself ; this Essence existing within itself, which universal Substance is. This simple Substance, which the Hindus call Brahma, is regarded as the Uni- versal, the self-existing Power; which is not, like passion, turned toward what is other than itself, but is the quiet, lustreless reflection into itself, which is, however, at the same time determined as Power. This abidingly self- enclosed Power in the form of Universality must be distinguished from its operation, from that which is posited by means of it, and from its own moments. Power is the Ideal, the Negative, for which all else exists merely as abrogated, as negated. But the Power, as that which exists within itself, as universal Power, distin- guishes itself from its moments themselves, and these therefore appear on the one hand as independent beings, and on the other as moments which even perish in the One. They belong to it, they are merely moments of it, but as differentiated moments they come forward into 12 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION independent existence, and present themselves as inde- pendent Persons Persons of the Godhead who are God, who are the Whole itself, so that that primary element vanishes in this particular shape or form, but on the other hand they again vanish in the one Power. The alternations according to which we have now the One, now the distinction as entire totality are the perplexing inconsistencies which present themselves in this sphere to the logical understanding, but they are at the same time that consistency of reason which is in accordance with the Notion, as contrasted with the consistency of the abstract self-identical understanding. Subjectivity is Power in itself, as the relation of infinite negativity to itself ; it is not, however, only potentially power, but rather it is with the appearance of subjectivity that God is for the first time posited as Power. These determinations are indeed to be distinguished from one another, and stand in relation to the subsequent concep- tions of God, and are also of primary importance to the understanding of the preceding ones. They are therefore to be considered more closely. Power, in fact, at once in religion in the general sense, and in the wholly immediate and crudest religion of nature, is the fundamental determination, as being the infinitude which the finite as abrogated posits within itself. And in so far as this is conceived of as outside of it, as existing at all, it nevertheless comes to be posited merely as something which has proceeded out of that finite as its basis. Now the determination which is all- important here is, that this Power is, to begin with, posited simply as the basis of the particular shapes or existing forms, and the relation to the basis of the in- herently existing Essence is the relation of Substantiality. Thus it is merely power potentially power as the inner element of the existence ; and as Essence which has Being within itself or as Substance, it is only posited as the Simple and Abstract, so that the determinations or DEFINi'lE RELIGION 13 differentiations as forms existing in their own right are conceived of as outside of it. This Essence, which exists within itself, may indeed be conceived of too as existing for itself, as Brahma is self-thinking. Brahma is the universal Soul ; when he creates, he himself issues as a breath out of himself ; he contemplates himself, and exists then for himself. But his abstract simplicity does not at once vanish owing to this, for the moments, the universality of Brahma as such, and the "/" for which that universality exists, these two are not determined as contrasted with one another, and their relation is therefore itself simple. Brahma exists thus as abstractly existing for himself. The Power and the basis of existences and all things have, in fact, proceeded out of him and vanished in him. In saying to himself, " I am Brahma," all things have vanished back into him, have vanished in him. Whether as outside of him, existing independently, or within him, they have vanished ; there is only the relation of these two extremes. But posited as differentiated determina- tions, they appear as independent existences outside of him, since he is primarily abstract, and not concrete in himself. The Power posited in this manner potentially only works inwardly without showing itself as activity. I manifest myself as power in so far as I am cause and determine, in so far as I am a subject, when I throw a stone, and so forth. But this potentially existing Power works in a universal manner, without this universality being a subject for itself, a self-conscious subject. These uni- versal modes of working, understood in their true char- acter, are, for instance, the Laws of Nature. Now Brahma, as the one, simple, absolute Substance, is the neuter, or, as we say, the Godhead: Brahma ex- presses this universal Essence more as a Person, as a subject. But this is a distinction which is not constantly made use of, and in the different grammatical cases this 14 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION distinction already spontaneously effaces itself, for the masculine and neuter genders have many cases which are similar. In another respect, too, no great emphasis is to be laid upon this distinction, because Brahma as personified' is merely superficially personified in such a manner that the content still remains this simple sub- stance. And now distinctions appear in this simple Substance, and it is worth noting that these distinctions present themselves in such a way that they are determined in accordance with the instinct of the Notion. The First is totality generally as One, taken quite abstractly ; the Second is determinateness, differentiation generally ; and the Third, in accordance with the true determination, is that the differences are led back again into unity, into concrete unity. Conceived of in accordance with its abstract form, this Trinity of the Absolute is, when it is formless, merely Brahma, that is, empty Essence. From the point of view of its determinations it is a Three, but in a unity only, so that this threeness is merely a unity. If we define this more accurately and speak of it under another form, the Second means that differentiations, different Powers exist : the differentiation, however, has no rights as against the one Substance, the absolute unity ; and in so far as it has no rights it may be called eternal goodness, implying that what has determinate character, this manifestation of the Divine, should indeed exist ; that differentiation too should attain to this, that it is. This is the goodness through which what is posited by the Power as a semblance or show of Being acquires momentary Being. In the Power it is absorbed, yet goodness permits it to exist independently. Upon this Second follows the Third that is, right- eousness, implying that the existing determinate element is not, that the finite attains to its end, its destiny, its right, which is to be changed, to be transformed, in DEFINITE RELIGION 15 fact, into another determinateness ; this is righteousness in the general sense. To this, in an abstract way, belong becoming, perishing, originating : for Not-being too has no right ; it is an abstract determination in contrast to Being, and is itself the passing over into unity. This totality, which is the unity, a Whole, is what is called among the Indians Tri murti murti = form or shape all emanations of the Absolute being called murti. It is this Highest, differentiated within itself in such a manner that it has these three determinations within itself. The most striking and the greatest feature in Indian mythology is unquestionably this Trinity in unity. We cannot call this Trinity Persons, for it is wanting in spiritual subjectivity as a fundamental determination. But to Europeans it must have been in the highest degree astonishing to meet with this principle of the Christian religion here : we shall become acquainted with it in its true form later on, and shall see that Spirit as concrete must necessarily be conceived of as triune. The First, then, the One, the One Substance, is what is called Brahma. Parabrahma, which is above Brahma, also makes its appearance ; and these are jumbled to- gether. Of Brahma, in so far as he is a subject, all kinds of stories are related. Thought, reflection, at once goes beyond such a determination as Brahma, since one having such a definite character is conceived of as One of these Three, makes itself a Higher, which gives itself a definite character in the distinction. In so far as that which is absolute Substance again appears as merely One alongside of others, Parabrahma is expressive of the need of thought to have something yet higher ; and it is im- possible to say in what definite relation forms of this kind stand to one another. Brahma is thus what is conceived of as this Substance out of which everything has proceeded and is begotten, as this Power which has created All. But while the one 1 6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Substance the One is thus the abstract Power, it at the same time appears as the inert element, as formless, inert matter ; here we have specially the forming activity, as we should express it. The one Substance, because it is only the One, is the Formless : thus this, too, is a mode in which it becomes apparent that substantiality does not satisfy ; that is to say, it fails to do so because form is not present. Thus Brahma, the one self-identical Essence, appears as the Inert, as that which indeed begets, but which at the same time maintains a passive attitude like woman, as it were. Krischna therefore says of Brahma, " Brahma is my uterus, the mere recipient in which I lay my seed, and out of which I beget All." In the determination, too, " God is Essence," there is not the principle of movement, of production ; there is no activity. Out of Brahma issues everything, gods, the world, mankind ; but it at once becomes apparent that this One is inactive. In the various cosmogonies or descriptions of the creation of the world, what has just been thus indicated makes its appearance. Such a description of the creation of the world occurs in the Vedas. In these Brahma is represented as being thus alone in solitude, and as existing wholly for himself, and a Being which is represented as a higher one then says to him that he ought to expand and to beget him- self. But Brahma, it is added, had not during a thousand years been in a condition to conceive of his expansion, and had returned again into himself. Here Brahma is represented as world-creating, but, owing to the fact that he is the One, as inactive, as one who is summoned by another higher than himself, and is formless. Tims the need of another is directly pre- sent. To speak generally, Brahma is this one absolute Substance. Power as this simple activity is Thought. In the Indian religion this characteristic is the most prominent one of all ; DEFINITE RELIGION 17 it is the absolute basis and is the One Brahma. This form is in accordance with the logical development. First came the multiplicity of determinations, and the advance con- sists in the resumption of determination into unity. That is the basis. What now remains to be given is partly something of a merely historical character, but partly, too, the necessary development which follows from that principle. Simple Power, as the active element, created the world. The creating is essentially an attitude of thought towards itself, an activity relating itself to itself, and in no sense a finite activity. This, too, is expressed in the ideas of the Indian religion. The Hindus have a great number of cosmogonies which are all more or less barbarous, and out of which nothing of a fixed character can be derived. What we have is not one idea of the creation of the world, as in the Jewish and Christian religion. In the Code of Manu, in the Vedas and Puranas, the cosmogonies are con- stantly understood and presented differently. Notwith- standing this, there is always one feature essentially present in them, namely, that this Thought, which is at home with itself or self-contained, is the begetting of itself. This infinitely profound and true trait constantly re- appears in the various descriptions of the creation of the world. The Code of Manu begins thus : " The Eternal with one thought created water," and so on. We also find that this pure activity is called " the Word," as God is in the New Testament. With the Jews of later times Philo, for example cro/?, mediator. It is curious that Herodotus, even in his time, makes special mention of this Mitra ; yet in the religion of the Parsis, the characteristic of mediation, reconciliation does not seem as yet to have become prominent. It was not until a later period that the worship of Mithras was more gener- ally developed in its complete form, as the human spirit had become more strongly conscious of the need of reconciliation, and as that need had become keener and more definite. Among the Piomans in Christian times Mithras-worship. VOL n. F 8i THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION was very widely spread, and so late as the Middle Ages" we meet with a secret Mithras-worship ostensibly con- nected with the order of the Knights-Templars. Mithras thrusting the knife into the neck of the ox is a figura- tive representation belonging essentially to the cult of Mithras, of which examples have been frequently found in Europe. (c.^ Worship. The worship belonging to this religion results directly from the essential character of the religion. The purpose of it is to glorify Ormazd in his creation, and the adora- tion of the Good in everything is its beginning and end. The prayers are of a simple and uniform character, with- out any special shades of meaning. The principal feature of the cultus is that man is to keep himself pure as regards his inner and outer life, and is to maintain and diffuse the same purity everywhere. The entire life of the Parsi is to be this worship ; it is not something isolated, as among the Hindus. It is the duty of the Parsi everywhere to promote life, to render it fruitful and keep it gladsome ; to practise good in word and deed in all places ; to further all that is good among mankind, as well as to benefit men themselves ; to exca- vate canals, plant trees, give shelter to wanderers, build waste places, feed the hungry, irrigate the ground, which, from another point of view, is itself subject and genius. Such is this oue-sidedness of abstraction. 2. The. Syrian Religion, or the Religion of Pain. We have just been considering the ideas of strife and of victory over evil. We have now to consider, as re- presenting the next moment or stage, that strife as Pain. " Strife as pain" seems a superficial expression ; it im- plies, however, that the strife is no longer an external opposition only, but is in a single subject, and within that subject's own feeling of itself. The strife is, accord- DEFINITE RELIGION 83 ingly, the objectifying of pain. Pain is, however, in general terms the course or process of finitude, and, from a subjective point of view, brokenness of heart. This process or course of finitude, of pain, strife, victory, is a moment or stage in the nature of Spirit, and it cannot be absent in the sphere under consideration, in which power continuously determines itself toward spiritual freedom. The loss of one's own self, the contradiction between self-contained Being and its " Other," a contra- diction which annuls itself by absorption into infinite unity for here we can think of true infinitude only the annulling of the opposition, these are the essential deter- minations in the Idea of Spirit which now make their appearance. It is true that we are now conscious of the development of the Idea, of its course as well as of its moments or stages, whose totality constitutes Spirit. This totality, however, is not as yet posited, but obtains expression in moments which in this sphere present them- selves successively. The content not being as yet posited in free Spirit, since the moments are not as yet gathered together into subjective unity, it exists in an immediate mode, and is thrown out into the form of Nature ; it is represented by means of a natural progressive process, which, however, is essentially conceived of as symbolical, and consequently is not merely a progressive process in external nature, but is an universal progressive process as contrasted with the point of view which we have hitherto occupied, and from which not Spirit but abstract Power is seen to be what rules. The next element in the Idea is the moment or stage of conflict. It is the essential nature of Spirit to come to itself out of its otherness and out of the overcoming of this otherness, by the negation of the negation. Spirit brings itself forth ; it passes through the estrangement of itself. But since it is not as yet posited as Spirit, this course of estrangement and return is not as yet posited ideally, and as a moment or stage 84 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION of Spirit, but immediately, and therefore in the form of what is natural. This determination, as we have seen it, has acquired a definite form in the religion of the Phoenicians and in the religions of anterior Asia generally. In these religions the Process which has been spoken of is con- tained, and in the religion of the Phoenicians the succumb- ing to death, the estrangement of the god from himself, and his resurrection are brought into special prominence. The popular conception regarding the Phcenix is well known : it is a bird which burns itself, and from out of its ashes there comes a young Phcenix in new vigour and strength. This estrangement, this otherness, defined as a natural negation, is death, but death that is at the same time annulled, since out of it there issues a revival and re- newal of life. It is the eternal nature of Spirit to die to self, to render itselif finite in Nature, and yet it is by the annulling of its natural existence that it comes to itself. The Phoenix is the well-known symbol of this. What we have here is not the warfare of Good with Evil, but a divine process which pertains to the nature of God Himself, and is the process in one individual. The more precise form in which this progressive process definitely appears is represented by Adonis. This repre- sentation has passed over to Egypt and Greece, and is mentioned in the Bible, too, under the name of Thammus (l^-D), Ezek. viii. 1 4, " And behold there sat women weeping for Thammus." One of the principal festivals of Adonis was celebrated in spring ; it was a service in honour of the dead, a feast of mourning which lasted several days. For two whole days Adonis was sought for with lamentation ; the third day was a joyous festival, when the god had risen again from the dead. The entire festival has the character of a solemn feast of Nature, which expires in winter and awakens again in spring. Thus in one aspect this is a natural process, but looked DEFINITE RELIGION 85 at in the other aspect it is to be taken symbolically as a moment of God, as descriptive of the Absolute in fact The myth of Adonis is associated even with Greek mythology. According to the latter, Aphrodite was the mother of Adonis. She kept him as a child of tender years concealed in a little chest, and took this to Ais. Persephone, however, would not give back the child out of the chest when the mother demanded it. Zeus decided the dispute by ordering that each of the goddesses was to keep Adonis for a third part of the year. The last third was to be left to his own choice ; he preferred to spend that time also with the universal mother and his own, namely, Aphrodite. As regards its direct inter- pretation, this myth, it is true, has reference to the seed lying under the ground, and then springing up out of it. The myth of Castor and Pollux, whose abode is alter- nately in the nether world and upon the earth, has also reference to this. Its true meaning, however, is not merely the alternation of Nature, but the transition generally from life, from affirmative Being, to death, to negation, and then again the rising up out of this nega- tion the absolute mediation which essentially belongs to the notion or conception of Spirit. Here therefore this moment of Spirit has become religion. 3 . The Religion of Mystery. The form which is peculiar to the religions of anterior Asia is that of the mediation of Spirit with itself, in which the natural element is still predominant ; the form of transition where we start from the Other as represent- ing what Nature in general is, and where the transition does not yet appear as the coming of Spirit to itself. The further stage at which we have now arrived is where this transition shows itself as a coming of Spirit to itself, yet not in such a way that this return is a reconciliation, 86 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION but rather that the strife, the struggle, is the object, as a moment, however, of the Divinity itself. This transition to spiritual religion contains, it is true, concrete subjectivity within itself ; it is, however, the free, unregulated play of this simple subjectivity ; it is the development of it, yet a development which is still, as it were, in a wild and effervescent state, and has not as yet arrived at a state of tranquillity, at the true spirituality which is essentially free. As in India the parts of this development were seen in an isolated state, so here the determinateness is in its detached state, but in such wise that these elementary powers of the Spiritual and the Natural are essentially related to subjectivity, and so related that it is one single subject which passes through these moments. In the Indian religions, also, we had origination and passing away, but not subjectivity, return into the One, not One which itself passes through these forms and differences, and in them and from out of them returns into itself. It is this higher Power of subjectivity which, when developed, lets the element of difference go out of itself, but when enclosed within itself holds fast, or rather overpowers the difference. The one-sidedness of this form consists in the absence of this pure unity of the Good, of the state of return, of self-contained Being. This freedom which we have here merely goes forth, merely impels itself forwards, but is not as yet, so to speak, complete, perfect, is not as yet such a beginning as would bring forth the end, the result. It is, therefore, subjectivity in its reality, not as yet, how- ever, in true, actual freedom, but in a state of fermenta- tion going in and out of this reality. The dualism of light and darkness begins to come to unity here, and in such a way that this dark, this nega- tive element, which, when intensified, even becomes evil, is included within subjectivity itself. It is the essential nature of subjectivity to unite opposite principles within DEFINITE RELIGION 87 itself, to be the force or energy which is able to endure this contradiction, and to dissolve it within itself. Ormazd has always Ahriman confronting him ; we also find the idea, it is true, that Ahriman is at last overcome, and Ormazd alone reigns ; but that is merely expressed as something in the future, not as anything that belongs to the present. God, Essence, Spirit, the True, must be present, not transported in idea into the past or the future. The Good and this is the most immediate demand must also be posited in actual fact as real power in itself, and being conceived of as universal, must thus be conceived of as real subjectivity. What we have at the present standpoint is this unity of subjectivity, and the fact that by means of these dis- tinguished moments, affirmation passes through negation itself, and ends with return into itself and reconciliation ; in such a way, however, that the action of this subjec- tivity is more the mere effervescence of it than the subjectivity which has actually attained to itself com- pletely, and already reached its consummation. One single subject constitutes this difference, a some- thing concrete in itself, one development. Thus this subjectivity imports itself into developed powers, and so unites them that they are set free. This subject has a history, is the history of life, of Spirit, of movement within itself, in which it breaks up into the differentia- tion of these powers, and in differentiation this subject converts itself into what is heterogeneous relatively to itself. Light does not become extinct, does not set, but here it is one single subject, which alienates itself from itself, is arrested in the negativity of itself, but reinstates itself by its own act in and from out of this estrangement. The result is the conception of free Spirit, not yet, how- ever, as true ideality, but, to begin with, as merely the impulse to bring the ideality into actual existence. Here we have reached the ultimate determination of 88 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION natural religion in this sphere, arid in fact the stage which constitutes the transition to the religion of free subjectivity. When we examine the stage of Parsiism, we perceive it to be the resumption of the finite into the essentially existent unity in which the Good determines itself. This Good is, however, only implicitly concrete, the determinateness is essentially simple, not as yet determination made manifest ; or, in other words, it is still abstract subjectivity, and not as yet real subjectivity. Accordingly, the next moment is, that outside of the realm of the Good, Evil has been given a determinate character. This determinateness is posited as simple, not developed ; it is not regarded as determinateness, but merely as universality, and therefore the development, the differ- ence is not as yet present in it as differentiated ; what we find rather is that one of the differentiated elements falls outside of the Good. Things are good merely as lighted up on their positive side only, not, however, on the side of their particularity also. We now, in accordance with the Notion, approach more nearly to the realm of real actual subjectivity. (a.) The characterisation or determination of the Notion of this stage. Material is not wanting for the determinations ; on tJae contrary, even in this concrete region that material presents itself with a determinate character. The differ- ence lies merely in this, namely, whether the moments of totality exist in a purely superficial, external form, or whether they have their being in the inner and essential element ; that is to say, whether they exist merely as superficial form and shape, or are posited, and thus thought of as the determination of the content. It is this that constitutes the enormous difference. In all religions we meet with the mode of self-consciousness, to a greater or less degree, and further with the predicates of God, such as omnipotence, omniscience, &c. Among the Hindus and Chinese we meet with sublime descrip- DEFINITE RELIGION ?9 tions of God, so that higher religions have no superiority over them in this respect : these are so-called pure con- ceptions of God (such, for example, as those in Friedrich von Schlegel's " Weisheit der Indier "), and are regarded as survivals of the perfect original religion. In the Eeligion of Light, too, we have already found that evil in an individual form is everywhere done away with. Subjec- tivity we have observed everywhere at the same time in the concrete determination of self-consciousness. Even at the stage of magic, the power of self-consciousness was above Nature. What really constitutes the special diffi- culty in the study of religion is that we have not to do here, as in logic, with pure thought- determinations, nor with existing ones, as in Nature, but with such as are not wanting in the moment of self-consciousness, of finite spirit in fact, since they have already run their course through subjective and objective Spirit. For religion is itself the self-consciousness of Spirit regarding its self, and Spirit makes the different stages of self-consciousness themselves, by which Spirit is developed into the object of consciousness for itself. The content of the object is God, the absolute Totality, and therefore the entire mani- foldness of matter is never wanting. It is'necessary, how- ever, to seek more precisely for definite categories, which form the differences of the religions. This difference is especially sought for in the mode of working of the Essence ; this last is everywhere, and yet is not ; it is further made to turn on the question as to whether there is or is not one God. This distinction is just as little to be relied upon, for even in the Indian religion there is to be found One God, and the difference then merely consists in the mode in which the many divine forms bind themselves together into unity. There are several Englishmen who hold that the ancient Indian religion contains the idea of the unity of God as a sun or universal soul. But predicates of the understanding such as these don't help us here. 90 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION When such predicates are given to God, we do not by the help of these determinations get a knowledge of Him in His true nature. They are even predicates of finite Nature; for it, too, is powerful, is wise. Taken as re- presenting a knowledge of God, they would be extended over finite matter through the All. In this way, how- ever, the predicates lose their definite meaning and are transient, like the Trimurti in Brahma. What is essential is contained in the One, in what is substantial, immanent ; it is essential determination, which is con- ceived and known as such. These are not the predicates of reflection, not external form, but Idea (Idee). Thus we have already had the determination of sub- jectivity, of self-determination, but merely in a super- ficial form, and not yet as constructing the nature of God. In the Religion of Light, this determination was abstract universal personification, because in the Person the absolute moments are not contained as developed or unfolded. Subjectivity is just abstract identity with self, is Being-within-itseif, which differentiates itself, but which is likewise the negativity of this difference, which latter maintains itself in the difference, does not let it escape out of itself, retains its sway over it, is in it, but in it independently, has the difference within it momentarily. i. If we consider this in relation to the next form, subjectivity is this negativity which relates itself to itself, and the negative is no longer outside of the Good, but rather it must be contained, posited in the affirmative relation to self, and thus is, in fact, no longer the Evil. Therefore the negative, Evil, must now no longer exist outside of the Good. It is just the essential nature of Good to be Evil, whereby of course Evil no longer re- mains Evil, but as Evil relating itself to itself, annuls its evil character and constitutes itself into Good. Good is that negative relation to itself as its other by which it posits Evil, just as the latter is the movement which DEFINITE RELIGION 91 posits its negation as negative, that is to say, which annuls it. This double movement is subjectivity. This is no longer that which Brahma is ; in Brahma these differences merely vanish, or, in so far as the difference is posited, it is found as an independent god outside of Brahma. The first and essentially universal form of subjectivity is not the perfectly free, purely spiritual subjectivity, but is still affected by Nature. It is thus, it is true, universal Power, but power which merely exists implicitly, such as we have hitherto met with. As subjectivity it is, on the contrary, posited actual power, and is so conceived of when it is taken as exclusive subjectivity. The distinction lies between power which is implicit and power so far as it is subjectivity. This last is posited power, is posited as power existent in its own right. We have already had power under every form. As a first fundamental determination it is a crude power over what has a bare existence ; then it is the inner element only, and the distinctions or differences appear as self-sustained existences outside of it ; existences which have, it is true, proceeded out of it, but which outside of it are independent, and which would have vanished, in so far as they were comprehended in it. Just as dis- tinctions vanish in Brahma, in this abstraction, when self-consciousness says, " I am Brahma" and from that moment everything that is divine, all that is good, has vanished in him, so the abstraction has no content, and the latter, in so far as it is outside of it, moves unsteadily about in a state of independence. In relation to parti- cular existences, power is the active agent, the basis ; but it remains the inner element merely, and acts in a universal way only. That which universal power brings forth, in so far as it is implicit, is also the Universal, the Laws of Nature; these belong to the power which is potentially existent. This power acts ; it is implicit power, its working likewise is implicit, it acts uncon- 92 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION sciously, and existing things, such as sun, stars, sea, rivers, men, animals, &c., appear as independent exis- tences ; their inner element only is determined by the power. Power can only show itself in this sphere as in opposition to the laws of nature, and here, accordingly, would be the place of miracles. But among the Hindus there are no miracles, for they have no rational intelli- gent Nature. Nature has no intelligent co-relation ; everything is miraculous, and therefore there are no miracles. These latter cannot exist until the God is determined as Subject, and as Power which has indepen- dent Being, and works in the manner characteristic of subjectivity. Where potentially existent Power is repre- sented as subject, it is of no consequence in what form it appears ; accordingly it is represented in human beings, in animals, &c. That vital force acts as immediate power cannot in any case be denied, since as power which is implicitly existent it works invisibly without showing itself. From this power actual power must be distinguished ; i/the latter is subjectivity, and in it two principal charac- teristics are to be observed. The first is that the subject is identical with itself, and at the same time posits definite distinct determina- tions within itself. There is one subject of these dis- tinctions ; they are the moments of one subject. The Good is thus the universal self-determination which is so entirely universal that it has the very same undiffe- rentiated extent as Essence; determination is, in fact, not posited as determination. To subjectivity belongs self- determination, and this means that the determinations present themselves as a plurality of determinations; that they have this reality in relation to the Notion, in con- trast to the simple self -involved Being of subjectivity. But at first these determinations are still enclosed within subjectivity, are inner determinations. - The second moment is that the subject is exclusive, DEFINITE RELIGION 93 is negative relation of itself to itself, as power is, but in relation to an Other. This Other is capable, too, of appearing as independent, but it is involved in this that the independence is only a semblance of independence, or else it is of such a kind that its existence, its embodi- ment, is merely a negative relatively to the power of subjectivity, so that this last is what is dominant. Ab- solute power does not hold sway; where there is the exercise of ruling authority, the Other is swallowed up. Here the latter abides, but obeys, serves as a means. The unfolding of these moments has now to be further considered. This process is of such a kind that it must arrest itself within certain limits, and for this reason especially, that we are as yet only in the transition to subjectivity ; the latter does not appear in a free and truthful form ; there is still an intermixture here of substantial unity and subjectivity. On the one hand, subjectivity does indeed unite everything; on the other hand, however, since it is as yet immature, it leaves the Other outside, and this intermixture has therefore the defect of that with which it is still entangled, namely, the religion of nature. In reference to the nature of the form in which Spirit has its self-consciousness con- cerning itself as the object of its consciousness, the stage now before us presents itself as the transition from the earlier forms to the higher stage of religion. Subjectivity does not as yet exist on its own account or for itself, and is consequently not yet free, but it is the middle point between substance and free subjectivity. This stage is therefore full of inconsistencies, and it is the problem of subjectivity to purify itself. This is the stage of Mystery or enigma. In this fermenting process all the moments present themselves. For this reason the consideration of this standpoint of thought possesses especial interest, because both stages, the preceding one of the religion of nature and the following one of free subjectivity, appear here in 94 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION their principal moments, the two being not yet severed. Accordingly there is here merely what is mysterious and confused, and by means of the Notion alone can the clue be obtained which indicates to which side such hetero- geneous elements tend to come together, and to w r hich of the two sides the principal moments belong. The God is still the inner nature here, implicit power, and for that reason the form this power may wear is accidental, is an arbitrary one. This merely implicitly existent power may be invested with this or the other human or animal form. The power is unconscious, active intelligence, which is not spiritual. It is mere Idea, not subjective Idea, however, but vitality void of conscious- ness in fact, life. This is not subjectivity, is not self, in fact ; but if life is to be presented as outward form at all, the form that lies nearest at hand for the purpose is that of some living creature. Within life in general the living, in fact, lies hidden ; what particular living creature, what animal, what human being this may be is a matter of indifference. We thus find zoolatry present at this stage, and. indeed, in the greatest variety : in different localities different animals are held in reverence or wor- shipped. From the point of view of the Notion it is of more importance that the subject is determined immanently within itself, is in its reflection into itself, and this de- termination is no longer the universal Good, though it certainly is the Good, and thus has Evil over against it. The next stage, however, is that actual subjectivity posits differences in its determination, that differentiated Good is posited here, an inner content ; and this content is of a definite and not of a merely general or universal char- acter. Not until differences can exist for me, not until possibility of choice is present, and only to the extent in which this is the case, is the subject an actual subject, or, in other words, does freedom begin. In this way the subject stands for the first time above particular ends, is DEFINITE RELIGION 95 free from particularity, when the latter has not the range of subjectivity itself, is no longer universal Good. ]t is another thing when the Good is at the same time made determinate, and is exalted into infinite wisdom. Here a plurality of Good is determined, and thus subjectivity occupies a position of superiority, and it appeals as its choice to desire one thing or the other; the subject is posited as deciding, and it appears as the determining of ends and of actions. The God as substantial unity does not appear as acting ; he annihilates, begets, is the basis of things, but does not act. Brahma, for example, does not act ; independent action is either merely imagined, or else pertains to the changing incarnations. Yet it is only a limited end or purpose which can come in here ; the subjectivity is merely the primal subjectivity, of which the content cannot as yet be infinite truth. It is at this point, too, that the outward form is deter- mined as human, and thus there is a transition of the god from the animal to human form. In free subjectivity the form which directly corresponds with such a con- ception is the human one alone ; it is no longer life only, but free determination in accordance with ends, therefore the human character appears as the form, it may be a particular subjectivity, a hero or an ancient king, &c. Here where the particular ends make their appearance as in the first form of subjectivity, the human form is not of the indefinite kind represented by Ormazd. On the contrary, specialised forms make their appearance, which have special ends, and are characterised by an element of locality. The principal moments coincide with this. That is to say, to speak more precisely, developed definite character must show itself in the subject ; the definite ends of action are limited, defined, are not determinateness in its totality. Determinate character must, however, show itself in the subject in its totality too ; developed subjectivity must be beheld 96 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION in it. The moments are not, however, the totality of the form, but present themselves in the first place as a sequence, as a course of life, as different states of the subject. Not until later does the subject as absolute Spirit arrive at the stage at which its moments are potential or implicit totality. Here the subject is still formal, still limited as regards determinate character, although Form in its entirety belongs to it, and thus there is still this limitation, that the moments are de- veloped into form as states only, and not each one for itself as a totality ; and it is not eternal history which is beheld in the subject as constituting the subject's nature, but merely the history of states or conditions. The first is the moment of affirmation, the second is negation, the third is the return of negation into itself. 2. The second moment is the one which is of most importance here. Negation shows itself as a certain state of the subject ; it is its alienation, death, in fact. The third is restoration, return to sovereignty. Death is the most immediate way in which negation shows itself in the subject, in so far as the latter has merely natural form generally, and also definitely existing human form. Further, this negation has besides the further character- istic that since what is here is not eternal history, is not the subject in its totality, this death comes to individual existence as it were by means of an Other, and from without, by means of the evil principle. Here we have God as subjectivity generally, and the most important moment in it is that negation is not found outside, but is already within the subject itself, and the subject is essentially a return into itself, is self- contained existence, Being which is at home with itself. This self-contained condition includes the difference which consists in positing and having an Other of itself nega- tion but likewise, in returning into itself, being with self, identical with itself in this return. There is One subject ; the moment of the negative, in DEFINITE RELIGION 97 so far as it is posited as natural in the character of what belongs to nature, is death. It is therefore the death of the god, and this characteristic presents itself for the first time here. The negative element, this abstract expression, has very many determinations it is change, in fact ; change also contains partial death. In the natural sphere this negation shows itself as death ; thus negation is still in the natural sphere, and not as yet purely in Spirit, in the spiritual subject as such. If it is in Spirit, this negation shows itself in the human being itself, in Spirit itself as this determination, namely, that its natural will is for it another will ; it distinguishes itself in its essence, in its spiritual character from its natural will. This natural will is here negation, and man comes to himself, is free Spirit, in overcoming this natural character, in having the natural particularity, this Other of rationality reconciled with rationality, and so being at home with himself, not outside of himself. It is only by means of this movement, of this course of thought, that such inner harmony, such reconciliation, comes to exist. If the natural will shows itself as Evil, then negation shows itself as something found. Man, in the act of raising himself to his true nature, finds this natural determination to be something opposed to what is rational. A higher conception, however, is that negation is that which is posited by Spirit. Thus God is Spirit, in that He begets His Son, the Other, posits the Other of Himself, yet in Him is still with Himself, and beholds Himself, and is eternal love. Here the negation is like- wise the transient or vanishing element. This negation in God is therefore that definite essential moment. Here, however, we have only the general idea of subjectivity, subjectivity in the general sense. Thus it comes to pass that the subject itself passes through these different states as its own states, in such a way that this negation VOL. II. G 98 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION is immanent in it. Then this determination, in so far as this negation appears as a natural state, enters as the determination of death, and the god appears here in the character of subjectivity in his eternal history, and shows himself to be the absolute Affirmative, which itself dies the moment of negation. He becomes alienated from himself, loses himself, but through this loss of himself finds himself again, returns to himself. In this religion, then, it is one and the same subject which passes through these different determinations. The negative, which we had iu the form of the Evil One, Ahriman, implying that negation does not belong to the self of Orrnazd, belongs here to the self of the god. We have already had negation in the form of death too. In Hindu mythology there are many incarnations ; Vishnu especially is the history of the world, and is now in the eleventh or twelfth incarnation. The Dalailama in like manner dies ; Indra, too, the god of the natural sphere dies, and there are others who die and come back again. But this dying is different from the negativity which is in question here, namely, death in so far as it pertains to the subject. As regards this difference, all depends en the logical determinations. In all religions analogies may be found, such ideas as those of God becoming man and of incarnations. The name Krishna has even been put side by side with that of Christ. Such comparisons, however, although the objects compared have something in common, some similar characteristic, are utterly super- ficial. The essential thing on which all depends is the fuller characterisation of the distinction, which last is overlooked. Thus the thousandfold dying of Indra is of a different kind from that above referred to. The Substance remains one and the same ; it forsakes merely the particular individual body of the one Lama, but has directly chosen ior itself another. This dying, therefore, this negation, DEFINITE RELIGION 99 has nothing to do with Substance, it is not posited in the Self, in the subject as such. The negation is not an actual inner moment, an immanent determination of Substance, and the latter has not the pain of death within itself. Here, for the first time, we have the death of the god as something within himself, implying that the negation is immanent in his essential nature, in his very self, and it is precisely owing to this that this god is essentially characterised as Subject. The nature of a subject is to give itself this otherness within itself, and through nega- tion of itself to return to itself, to produce itself. This death appears at first as something undignified ; we have the idea that it is the lot of the finite to pass away, and in accordance with this idea death, in so far as it is spoken of in connection with God, is only transferred to Him as a determination out of the sphere of that finite which is inadequate to Him. God does not in this way get to be truly known, but rather is debased by the determination of negation. Over against that assertion of the presence of death in the divine stands the demand that God should be conceived of as a supreme Being, only identical with himself, and this conception is reckoned as the highest and most honourable, so that it is only at the end that Spirit reaches it. If God be thus conceived as the Supreme Being, He is without content, and this is the poorest possible idea of Him, and quite an antiquated one. The first step of the objective attitude is the step to this abstraction, to Brahma, in whom no negativity is contained. Good, light, is like- wise this abstraction, which has the negative only out- side of itself as darkness. From this abstraction an advance is already made here to the concrete idea of God, and in this way the moment of negation enters, at first in this peculiar or special mode as death, inasmuch as God is now beheld in human form. And thus the moment of death is to be ranked high, as an essential TOO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION moment of God Himself as immanent in Essence. To self-determination belongs the moment of inner, not out- ward negativity, as is already implied in the expression " self-determination." The death which here comes into prominence is not like the death of the Lama, of Buddha, of Indra, and other Indian deities, whose negativity is an external one, and approaches them as a power that is external to them. It is a sign that there has been an advance toward conscious spirituality, to knowledge of freedom, to the knowledge of God. This moment of negation is an absolutely true moment of God. Death, then, is a peculiar special form, in which negation makes its appearance in an outward shape. By reason of the divine totality the moment of immediate form must become recognised in the divine Idea, for to it there must be nothing wanting. Thus the moment of negation is immanent in the divine Notion, because it essentially belongs to it in its outward manifestation. In the other religious we have seen that the essential nature of God is merely deter- mined as abstract Being-within-itself, absolute substan- tiality of Himself. There death is not thought of as belonging to substance, but is regarded merely as exter- nal form, in which the god shows himself. It is quite otherwise when it is an event which happens to the god himself, and not merely to the individual iu whom he presents himself. It is thus the essential nature of God which comes into prominence here in this determination. 3. But now, further, we have in close connection with this the idea that God restores himself, rises from the dead. The immediate god is not God. Spirit is alone what, as being free in itself, exists by its own act,- what posits itself. This contains the moment of nega- tion. The negation of the negation is the return into self, and Spirit is the e-ternal return into self. Here then at this stage we come upon Reconciliation. Evil, death, is represented as vanquished, God is consequently DEFINITE RELIGION 101 once more reinstated, restored again, and as thus eternally returning into himself is he Spiiit. (b.) The concrete idea belonging to this stage. In this religion, as it actually exists in the religion of the Egyptians, there occur an infinite variety of forms or figures. But the soul or animating principle of the Whole is what constitutes the chief characteristic, and it [_ is brought into prominence in the principal figure. This is Osiris, who in the first place, it is true, has negation opposed to him as external, as other than himself, as Typhon. This external relation is not, however, perma- nent in the sense of being only a strife such as that carried on by Ormazd ; on the contrary, negation makes its entrance into the subject itself. The subject is slain, Osiris dies, but he is eternally restored again, and he is thus posited in popular con- ception as born a second time, this birth not having a natural character, but being posited as something apart from what is natural or sensuous. He is consequently posited, defined as belonging to the realm of general ideas, to the region of the Spiritual, which endures above and beyond the finite, not to the natural sphere as such. Osiris is the God of popular conception, the God con- ceived of or mentally represented in. accordance with his inner character. Accordingly in the idea that he dies, but is likewise restored, it is expressly declared that he is present in the realm of general ideas as opposed to mere natural being. But he is not only conceived of in this way ; he be- comes known too as such. That does not mean the same thing. As represented in the form of idea, Osiris is defined as the ruler in the realm of Amenthes ; as he is lord of the living, so also is he lord of what no longer continues in sensuous existence, but of the continuously existing soul, which has severed itself from the body, from what is sensuous, perishable. The kingdom of the dead is the realm where natural being is overcome, the 102 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION realm of ideas or ordinary thought where what is pre- served is precisely that which has not natural existence. Typhon, Evil, is overcome, and likewise pain, and Osiris is the judge in accordance with law and justice. Evil is overcome, is condemned ; and with this the act of judgment makes its first appearance, and does so as what decides ; that is to say, Good has the power to assert itself, and to annihilate the non-existent, the evil. If we say Osiils is a ruler of the dead, the dead are in 'this case just such as are not held to be in the sensuous natural sphere, but have independent continuous exist- ence in a region beyond what is sensuous and natural. Connected with this is the fact that the individual sub- ject is known as continuous, as something withdrawn from the region of the transitory, as something having a fixed, independent existence, something distinguished from what is sensuous. That is a thoroughly weighty saying of Herodotus re- garding immortality, namely, that the Egyptians were the first to declare that the soul of man is immortal. We find this continued life, this metamorphosis in India and China, but this, like the continued life of the individual, the immortality of the Hindus, is itself merely some% thing subordinate and unessential. What is with them highest is not an affirmative permanent duration, but is Nirvana, continuous existence in the state of annihilation of the Affirmative, or only a semblance of affirmation, the being identical with Brahma. This identity, this union with Brahma, is at the same time a melting away into this unity, which is, it is true, seemingly affirmative, and yet is in itself utterly devoid of determination and without differentiation. But what we have here as a logical deduction is this : the highest form of consciousness is subjectivity as such ; this is totality, and is able to exist independently in itself ; it is the idea of true independence or self-existence. We call that independent or self- sustained which is DEFINITE RELIGION 103 not in a condition of opposition, which rather overcomes that opposition, does not contain a finite over against itself, but has this opposition within itself, yet at the same time has conquered there. This determination of that subjectivity which is objective, which pertains to the objective, namely, to God, is also the determination of the subjective consciousness. This consciousness knows itself as subject, as totality, true independent existence, and consequently as immortal. With this knowledge the higher destiny of man dawned upon consciousness. This negation of the negation, namely, that death is slain, that the evil principle is vanquished, is thus a determination of supreme moment. Among the Parsis that principle is not overcome, but the Good, Ormazd, stands opposed to the Evil, Ahriman, and has not yet arrived at this reflection. It is here in the Egyptian religion that the vanquishing of the evil principle is for the first time posited. Herewith, accordingly, that determination comes in which was mentioned above, and which we have already recognised, namely, that this one who is born again, is represented directly afterwards as having departed ; he is ruler in the kingdom of Amenthes ; as he is Lord of the living, so also is he Judge of the dead in accordance with right and justice. Here for the first time right and morality come in, in the determination of subjective freedom ; both, on the contrary, are wanting in the God of substantiality. So then there is a penalty or punish- ment here, and the individual worth of man, which de- termines itself in accordance with morality and right, comes into prominence. Around this Universal play an infinite number of popular conceptions of deities. Osiris is only one of these conceptions, and according to Herodotus is even one of the latest ; but it is principally in the realm of Amenthes as ruler of the dead, as Serapis, that he has risen above all other gods as an object of supreme interest. io4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Herodotus, following the statements of the priests, gives a series of Egyptian gods, and Osiris is to be found here among the later ones. But the further development of the religious consciousness takes place also within a religion itself, and we have already seen in the Indian religion that the worship of Vishnu and Siva is of later date. In. the sacred books of the Farsis Mithras is put among the other Amshadspans, and stands 011 the same level with them ; but Herodotus already gives prominence to Mithras, and at the time of the Romans, when all religions were brought to Rome, the worship of Mithras was one of the principal religions, while the service of Ormazd had not anything like the same importance. Among the Egyptians, too, in the same manner Osiris is said to be a deity of later date. It is well known that in the time of the Romans, Serapis, a special form of Osiris, was the principal deity of the Egyptians, and yet, although it was in later times that the idea of him dawned upon the human mind, he is none the less the deity in whom the totality of consciousness disclosed itself. The antithesis contained in the Egyptian view accord- ingly next loses its profound meaning and becomes a superficial one. Typhon is physical evil and Osiris the vitalising principle; to the former belongs the barren desert, and he is conceived as the burning wind, the scorching heat of the sun. Another antithesis is the natural one of Osiris and Isis, the sun and the earth, which is regarded as the principle of procreation generally. Thus Osiris too dies, is vanquished by Typhon, and Isis seeks everywhere for his bones : the god dies, here again is this negation. The bones of Osiris are then buried ; he himself, however, has now become ruler of the kingdom of the dead. Here we have the course of living nature, a necessary cycle returning into itself. The same cycle belongs also to the nature of Spirit, and the fate of Osiris exhibits the expression of it. Here again the one signifies the other. DEFINITE RELIGION 105 To Osiris the other deities attach themselves ; he is the uniting point, and they are only single moments of the totality which he represents. Thus Ammon is the moment of the Sun, which characteristic also pertains to Osiris. There are besides a great number of deities which have been called the deities of the calendar, because they have a relation to the natural revolutions of the year. Particular periods of the year, like the vernal equinox, the early summer, and the like, are brought into prominence and personified in the deities of the calendar. Osiris, however, signifies what is spiritual, not only what is natural ; he is a lawgiver, he instituted mar- riage, taught agriculture and the arts. In these popular conceptions are found historical allusions to ancient kings : Osiris consequently contains historical features too. In the same way the incarnations of Vishnu seem to point to the conquest of Ceylon in the history of India. Just as the special characteristics represented by Mithras as being the most interesting were brought into prominence, and the religion of the Parsis became the worship of Mithras, so Osiris has become the central point here; not, however, in the immediate, but in the spiritual and intellectual world. What has been said implies that subjectivity exists at first in the form of idea or ordinary thought here. We have to do with a subject, with a spiritual being con- ceived after a human fashion. This subject is not, how- ever, a man in his immediate character, his existence not being posited in the immediacy of human thought, but in that of popular conception or ordinary thought. It is a content which has moments, movement in it- self, by means of which it is subjectivity, but is also in the form, on the plane of spirituality, exalted above the Natural. Thus the Idea (Idee) is posited in this region of general conception, but is marked by the deficiency Io6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION consequent on its being merely a conception formed by subjectivity, by subjectivity as resting on an abstract basis. The depths of the universal antithesis are not in it as yet ; subjectivity is not yet grasped in its absolute univer- sality and spiritual nature. Thus it is superficial, external universality. The content which is in idea or ordinary thought is not bound to time ; it is posited in the region of Univer- sality. The sensuous particularity which implies that a thing exists at a definite time or in definite space is stripped off. Everything, since it rests on a spiritual basis, owing to the presence of general ideas, has univer- sality, although very little of the sensuous is stripped off as, for example, in the idea of a house. The Univer- sality is thus external Universality only, the possession of certain common features. That external Universality is still the predominating principle here, is intimately connected with the fact that the foundation, this idea of Universality, is not as yet absolutely immersed in itself, is not as yet a filled up or concrete basis in itself, which absorbs everything, and by means of which natural things are posited ideally. In so far as this subjectivity is the Essence, it is. the universal basis, and the history which the subject is becomes known at once as movement, life, as the history of all things, of the immediate world. And so we have the distinction which is implied in the fact that this universal subjectivity is also the basis for the Natural. It is the inner Universal, that which is the Substance of the Natural. We have, therefore, two elements here, the Natural element and the inner Substance, and in this we have what characterises symbolism. To natural Being a foundation other than itself is attributed ; what is im- mediate and sensuous acquires another substance. It is no longer itself as immediate, but represents or means DEFINITE RELIGION 107 something Other than itself, which is its substance, its meaning. Now in this abstract relation of things the history of Osiris is the inner essential history of the Natural too of the nature of Egypt. To this belong the sun, its course in the heavens, the Nile, which fertilises and which fluctuates. The history of Osiris is therefore the history of the sun ; the sun goes onward till it reaches its culminating point, then it returns ; its rays, its strength, become feeble, but afterwards it begins to lift itself up again it is born anew. Thus Osiris signifies the sun and the sun Osiris, the sun being conceived of as this cycle. The year is considered as the single subject, which in its own history runs its course through these diverse states. In Osiris what belongs to nature is conceived of as being a symbol of the subject's history. Thus Osiris is the Nile, which increases, renders everything fruitful, overflows, and through the heat here the evil principle comes into play becomes small and impotent, then again recovers its strength. The year, the sun, the Nile are conceived as this cycle which returns into itself. The special aspects of such a course are represented as existing momentarily apart and in independence, as a multitude of gods who indicate particular aspects or moments of this cycle. Now, if it be said that the Nile is the inner element, that the meaning of Osiris is the sun, the Nile, and the other gods are calendar deities, such a statement would not be without truth. The one is the kernel, the other what outwardly represents it, the sign, the signifier, by means of which this inner element manifests itself externally. At the same time, however, the course of the Nile is universal history, and they may be taken as standing to each other in a reci- procal relation, the one as the inner element and the other as the form of representation or of apprehension. loS THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AVhat really is that' inner element is Osiris, the subject, this cycle which returns into itself. In this mode of representing the truth it is the symbol which is the dominant factor. We have an independent inner element which has an external mode of existence, and these two are distinct from one another. It is the inner element, the subject, which is free here, which has be- come independent, in order that that inner element may be the substance of what is external, and may not be in contradiction with it, may not be a dualism, but be the signification, the independently self-existing idea, in con- trast to the sensuous mode of existence in which last it constitutes the central point. The representation of subjectivity in this definite shape as the central point is closely connected with the impulse to give the idea visible form. The idea as such must express itself, and it is man who must bring this meaning out of himself and give it a visible form. The immediate has already vanished if it is supposed to appear under the conditions of sense-perception or in some particular mode of immediacy, and the general idea is under the necessity of giving itself completeness in this way. If the general idea thus integrates itself; this immediacy must be of a mediated character, a pro- duction of man. Formerly we had visibility, immediacy in a natural unmediated mode, where Brahma has his existence, the mode of his immediacy in thought, in the immersion or sinking down of man into himself. Such was the case too where the Good is light, and therefore in the form of an immediacy which exists in an immediate mode. Since here, however, the starting-point is ordinary thought or idea, this must give itself to a definite sen- suous form, and must bring itself to immediacy. It is, however, a mediated immediacy, because it is an im- mediacy posited by man. It is the inner element which DEFINITE RELIGION 109 is to be brought to immediacy : the Nile, the course of the year, are immediate existences, but they are symbols only of the inner element. Their history, as natural, is gathered up and comprised within idea, this unification, this course appearing as one subject, and the subject itself is intrinsically the return- ing movement already spoken of. This cycle is the subject, which idea is, and which as the subject is to make itself perceptible by sense. (c.) Worship or cultus. The impulse just described may be regarded as re- presenting in general the cultus of the Egyptians, this endless impulse to work, to describe or represent out- wardly what is as yet only inward, contained in idea, and for this reason has not become clear to the mind. The Egyptians worked on for thousands of years. First of all they put their soil into order ; but the work which has relation to religion is the most amazing that has ever been accomplished, whether upon the earth or under it. Think of the works of art still in existence, but in the form of parched and arid ruins, which, how- ever, on account of their beauty and the toil which their construction represents, have been a source of astonish- ment to all the world. It has been the task, the deed of this people to pro- duce these works ; there was no pause in this production ; we see the spirit labouring ceaselessly to render its idea visible to itself, to bring into clearness, into conscious- ness, what it inwardly is. This restless industry of an entire people is directly based upon the definite character which the god has in this religion. First of all we may recall how, in Osiris, spiritual moments too are revered, such as justice, morality, the institution of marriage, art, and so forth. Osiris is, however, in a special sense the lord of the realm of the dead, judge of the dead. A countless number of pictures or representations are to be found in which Osiris is 1 10 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION delineated as judge, while before him. is a scribe, who is reckoning up for him the deeds of the soul brought into his presence. This realm of the dead, that of Amenthes, constitutes a principal feature in the religious conceptions of the Egyptians. As Osiris, the life-giving, was opposed to Typhon, the annihilating principle, and was the sun of the earth, so the antithesis of the living and the dead makes its first appearance here. The realm of the dead is just as fixed a conception as the realm of the living. The realm of the dead discloses itself when natural Being is overcome ; it is just there that what has no longer natural existence persists. The enormous works of the Egyptians which still remain to us are almost entirely those only which were destined for the dead. The celebrated labyrinth had as many chambers above as beneath the ground. The palaces of the kings and priests have been transformed into heaps of rubbish, while their tombs have bid defiance to time. Deep grottos extending several miles in length are to be found hewn in the rock for the mummies, and all the walls are covered with hieroglyphics. But the ob- jects which excite the greatest admiration are the pyramid- ' temples for the dead, not so much in memory of them, as in order to serve them as burial-places and as dwell- ings. Herodotus says that the Egyptians were the first who taught that souls are immortal. It may occasion surprise that, although the Egyptians believed in the im- mortality of the soul, they yet devoted so much care to their dead : one might think that man, if he holds the soul to be immortal, would no longer have special respect for his body. But, on the contrary, it is precisely those peoples who do not believe in an immortality who hold the body in slight esteem after its death, and do not provide for its preservation. The honour which is shown to the dead is wholly dependent upon the idea of immortality. If the body falls into the power of the forces of nature, which are no longer restrained by the DEFINITE RELIGION in soul, yet still man does not wish, at least that nature, as such, should be that which exerts its power and physical necessity over the exanimated body, that noble casket of the soul. Man's desire is, on the contrary, that he himself should exert this power over it. Men accordingly endeavour to protect it against nature as such, or give it themselves, by their own free will, as it w.ere, back to the earth, or else annihilate it by means of fire. In the Egyptian mode of honouring the dead and preserving the body, there is no mistaking the fact that man knew himself to be exalted above the power of nature, and therefore sought to maintain his body against this power, in order to exalt it above it too. The me- thods followed by peoples in their treatment of the dead stands in the closest connection with the religious prin- ciple, and the different customs which are usual at burial are not without bearings of very great importance. In order then to understand the peculiar position of Art at this stage, we have to recollect that subjectivity does, as a matter of fact, begin to appear here, but as yet only so far as its basis is concerned, and that its conception or idea still passes over into that of substan- tiality. Consequently the essential differences have not yet mediated and spiritually permeated each other ; on the contrary, they are as yet mixed together. Several noteworthy features may be specified which elucidate this intermixture and combination of what is present and of living things with the Idea of the Divine, so that either the Divine is made into something present, or on the other hand into something human ; and in fact here even animal forms become divine and spiritual moments Herodotus quotes the Egyptian myth that the Egyptians had been ruled by a succession of kings who were gods. In this there is already the mixing together of the ideas that the god is known as king, and again the king as god. Further, we see in the countless number of the representations of art which portray the consecration of ii2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION kings, that the god appears as the consecrator and the king as the son of this god ; then the king himself too is found represented as Ammon. It is related of Alex- ander the Great that the oracle of Jupiter Ammon de- clared him to be the son of that god. This is quite in accordance with the Egyptian character, for the Egyptians said the very same of their kings. The priests were esteemed at one time as the priests of the gods, and then as God himself also. Many monuments and inscriptions remain even from later times, where the Ptolemaic king is always and only called the son of god, or God him- self. The same thing happened in the case of the Eoman Emperors. Astonishing certainly, yet considering the mixture of the conception of substantiality with that of subjectivity, no longer inexplicable, is that Zoolatry the practice of which was carried out by the Egyptians in the most rigid manner. In various districts of Egypt special animals were worshipped, such as cats, dogs, monkeys, and so forth ; and this worship was even the occasion of wars between the various districts. The life of such animals was held absolutely sacred, and to kill them was to incur severe punishment. Further, dwelling-places and estates were granted to these animals, and provisions laid up for them : indeed, it even happened in a time of famine that human beings were permitted to die rather than that those stores should be invaded. The apis was most of all held in reverence ; for it was believed that this bull represented the soul of Osiris. In the coffins in some of the pyramids, apis bones were found carefully preserved. Every form of this religion and every shape taken by it is mingled with zoolatry. This worship of animals is un- doubtedly connected with what is most offensive and hateful. But it has been already shown in connection with the religion of the Hindus how man could arrive at the stage in which he worships an animal. If God be not known as Spirit, but rather as po^Yer in general, then DEFINITE RELIGION 113 this power is unconscious activity universal life, it may be. This unconscious power then appears under an out- ward form, and first of all in that of an animal. An animal is itself something devoid of consciousness, it leads a dull, still life within itself, as compared with human caprice or free-will, so that it may appear as if it had within itself this unconscious power which works in the whole. Especially peculiar and characteristic, however, are the forms under which the priests or scribes so frequently appear in plastic representations and paintings with animal masks ; and the same is the case with the em- balmers of mummies. This duplicate form, an external mask concealing another form underneath it, intimates that the consciousness is not merely sunken in dull, animal life, but also knows itself to be separated from it, and recognises in it a further signification. In the political state of Egypt, too, we find the struggle of Spirit seeking to extricate itself from immediateness. Thus history frequently mentions the conflicts of the kings with the priestly caste, and Herodotus speaks of these even from the earliest times. King Cheops caused the temple of the priests to be shut up, while other kings reduced the priestly caste to complete subjection and excluded them from all power. This opposition is no longer Oriental ; we see here the human free-will revolting against religion. This emerg- ence from a state of dependence is a trait which it is essential to take into account. It is especially, however, in naive and highly pic- torial representations in artistic forms that this strug- gling on the part of Spirit and its emergence from Nature, are expressed. It is only necessary to think of the image of the Sphinx, for example. In Egyptian works of art everything, indeed, is symbolical ; the significance in them reaches even to the minutest details ; even the number of pillars and of steps is not reckoned in accord - VOI* II. H U4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION ance with external suitability to ends, but means either the months, or the feet that the Nile has to rise in order to overflow the land, or something of a similar kind. The Spirit of the Egyptian nation is, in fact, an enigma. In Greek works of art everything is clear, everything is evident ; in Egyptian art a problem is everywhere presented ; it is an external sign, by means of which something which has not been yet openly expressed is indicated. Even if, however, at this standpoint Spirit is still in a state of fermentation, and still has the drawback of a want of clearness, and if even the essential moments of religious consciousness are in part mingled with one another, and partly in this intermingling, or rather on account of this intermingling, are in a state of mutual strife, yet it is still free subjectivity which here takes its rise, and thus it is precisely here that art too, more correctly speaking fine art, must of necessity make its appearance and is needful in religion. Art, it is true, is imitation, but not that alone ; it may, notwithstanding, arrest itself at that, but it is then neither fine art nor does it represent a need belonging to religion. Only as fine art does it pertain to the Notion of God. True art is religious art, but art is not a necessity where God has still a natural form ; for example, that of the sun or of a river. It is also not a necessity in so far as the reality and visibility of God are expressed in the outward shape of a man or of an animal, nor when the mode of manifestation is light. It begins, it is true, when, as in the case of Buddha, the actual human form, has dropped away, but still exists in imagination ; and thus it has a commencement where there is imaginative conception of the divine form, as, for example, in images of Buddha ; in this case, however, the Divine is regarded as at the same time still present in the teachers, his followers. The human form in the aspect in which it is the appearance of subjectivity, is only then necessary DEFINITE RELIGION 1 1 5 when God is determined as subject. The need begins to exist when the moment of Nature, of immediacy, is overcome, in the conception of subjective self-determi- nation or in the conception of freedom that is to say, at the standpoint which we have now reached. Inas- much as the mode of definite Being is determined by means of the inner element itself, the natural form is no longer sufficient, nor is the imitation of it sufficient either. All peoples, widi the exception of the Jews and Mahommedans, have images of their gods ; these, however, do not belong to fine art, but are mere per- sonifications of conceptions or ideas, signs of merely conceived or imagined subjectivity, where this last does not as yet exist as immanent determination of the Essence itself. Figurate conception or idea has an external form in religion, and from this what is known as pertaining to the Divine Essence is to be essentially distinguished. In the Hindu religion God has become man ; it is in totality that Spirit is always present : whether, however, the moments are looked upon as belonging to the Essence or as not belonging to it, is what makes all the difference. It thus becomes a necessity to represent God by means of fine art when the moment of naturalness is overcome, when Spirit exists as free subjectivity, and its manifestation, its appearance in its definite existence, is determined by means of Spirit from within, and exhibits the character of something which is a spiritual produc- tion. Not until God Himself has the determination of positing the differences under which He appears, out of His own inner Being, not until then does art enter as necessary for the form given to the god. Iii connection with the introduction here of art, two moments specially deserve attention : first, that God is presented in art as something capable of being beheld by sense ; secondly, that as a work of art the god is something produced by human hands. To our notions, n6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION both of these represent modes which are inadequate to the Idea of God so far, that is to say, as they are supposed to be the sole mode ; for of course we are all aware that God has been outwardly visible to sense, though only as a transient moment. Art, too, is not the ultimate mode of our worship. But for the stage of that subjectivity which is not as yet spiritualised, which is thus itself as yet immediate, existence which is visible in an immediate way is both adequate and necessary. Here this is the entirety of the mode of manifestation of what God is for self-consciousness. Thus art makes its appearance here, and this implies that God is apprehended as spiritual subjectivity. It is the nature of Spirit to produce itself, so that the mode of definite existence is one created by the subject, an estrangement or externalisation which is posited by the act of the subject itself. That the subject posits itself, manifests itself, determines itself, that the mode of determinate Being or existence in a definite form is one posited by Spirit, is implied when art is present. Sensuous existence, in which God is visibly beheld, is commensurate with His Notion ; it is not a sign, but expresses in every point that it is produced from within, that it corresponds with thought, with the inner Notion. But it has the defect of being still a sensuously visible mode, that the mode in which the subject posits itself is sensuous. This defect is the consequence of its being as yet subjectivity in its first form, the primal free Spirit ; its determination is its first determination, and thus its freedom is that of what is as yet natural, immediate, primal determination ; that is to say, the moment of Nature, of sense. The other point is that the work of art is produced by human beings. This, too, is inadequate to our Idea of God. That is to say, infinite, truly spiritual subjec- tivity, that which exists for itself as such, produces itself by its own act, posits itself as Other, namely, as its out- DEFINITE RELIGION 117 ward form or shape, and this last is posited by means of subjectivity itself, and produced freely. But this its assumption of form, which to begin with as the 1 = 1, is as yet reflected into itself, must also have the determina- tion of differentiation expressly in such a way that this differentiation is merely determined by means of subjec- tivity, or, in other words, that it merely appears in this which is at first still something external. This first free- dom further comes to have an additional element, namely, that the outward embodiment produced by the subject is taken back into subjectivity. What is First is thus the creation of the world ; what is Second is the reconcilia- tion, namely, that it reconciles itself in itself with the true First. In the subjectivity which is before us at this stage, this return is not as yet present, its mode of exist- ence being as yet of an implicit character ; its existence as subject is found outside of it in the form of Being- for-other. The Idea is not as yet there ; for to it belongs that the Other should of its own act reflect itself into the primal unity. This second part of the process which pertains to the divine Idea is not as yet posited here. If we consider the determination as end or aim, then the primal action of subjectivity regarded as an end is still a limited end ; it has reference to this particular people, this definite particular end, and if it is to become uni- versal, a truly absolute end, the return is essential, and the doing away with what is merely natural in respect of the outward form is essential likewise. Thus, the Idea is first present when this second part of the process is added to the first, the part which annuls the natural character, the limitation of the end, and it is owing to this that it becomes for the first time an universal end. Here Spirit as regards its manifestation is only the half way of Spirit ; it is still one-sided finite Spirit, in other words, subjective Spirit, subjective self-consciousness ; it is the outward form of the god, the mode of his existence for an " Other." The work of art is merely something ii8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION accomplished, posited by the finite spirit, by the subjec- tive spirit, and for this reason the work of art must be executed by man. This explains why it is necessary that the manifestation of the gods by means of art is a manifestation fashioned by human hands. In the religion of absolute Spirit the outward form of God is not made by the human spirit. God Himself is, in accordance with the true Idea, self-consciousness which exists in and for itself. Spirit. He produces Himself of His own act, appears as Being for "Other;" He is, by His own act, the Son ; in the assumption of a definite form as the Son, the other part of the process is present, namely, that God loves the Son, posits Himself as identical with Him, yet also as distinct from Him. The assumption of form makes its appearance in the aspect of determinate Being as independent totality, but as a totality which is retained within love ; here, for the first time, we have Spirit in and for itself. The self-consciousness of the Son regarding Himself is at the same time His knowledge of the Father ; in the Father the Son has knowledge of His own self, of Himself. At our present stage, on the contrary, the determinate existence of God as God is not existence posited by Himself, but by what is Other. Here Spirit has stopped short half way. This defect of art, namely, that the god is made or fashioned by man, is also felt in those religions in which this is the highest manifestation, and attempts are made to remedy the defect, not, however, in an objective, but in a subjective way. Images of the gods must be consecrated ; alike by the Negro and the Greek they are consecrated, that is to say, the divine Spirit is put into them by a process of conjuration. This results from the consciousness, the feeling of defect ; but the mode of remedying it is one which is not contained in the objects themselves, but comes to them from without. Even among the Catholics such consecration takes place ; of pictures, for example, relics, and the like. DEFINITE RELIGION 119 This explains the necessity there is that art should make its appearance here, and the moments indicated are those from which it results that the god exists as a work of art. Here, however, art is not yet free and pure ; it is not as yet even in the process of transition to fine art. In this perverted state it still presents itself in such a way that outward forms which belong to im- mediate nature, and which are not produced by Spirit, such as the sun, animals, &c., do just as well as any other for self-consciousness. The artistic form which breaks forth out of an animal, the form of the Sphinx, is more a mixture of artistic form and animal form. Here a human countenance looks forth upon us from the body of an animal ; subjectivity is as yet not clear or manifest to itself. The artistic form is therefore not as yet purely beautiful, but is more or less imitation and distortion. The general character of this sphere is the intermingling of subjectivity and substantiality. The artistic activity of this whole people was not as yet absolutely pure fine art, but rather the impulse towards the fine art. Fine art contains this determination, namely, that Spirit must have become in itself free free from passion, from the natural life in general, from a condition of subjugation or thraldom produced by means of inner and outer Nature ; it must feel the need to know itself as free, and thus to exist as the object of its consciousness. In so far as Spirit has not yet arrived at the stage of thinking itself free, it must picture itself as free, must have itself before itself as free Spirit in sensuous per- ception. If it is thus to become an object for sensuous perception in the mode of immediacy, which is a product, this involves that its definite existence, its immediacy, is wholly determined by means of Spirit, has entirely such a character as implies that here it is a free spirit which is described. This, however, is precisely what we call the Beautiful, in which all externality is absolutely significant and 120 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION characteristic, and determined by the inner element as representing that which is free. We have here a natural material which implies that the features in it are simply tokens of the Spirit which is essentially free. The natural moment must, in fact, be overcome, that it may serve for the expression, the revelation of Spirit. While the content in the Egyptian characteristic quality is this subjectivity, the impulse present here toward fine art is one which is worked out architecturally for the most part, and has at the same time endeavoured to pass over to beauty of form. Inasmuch, however, as it was only impulse, beauty itself as such has not as yet actually appeared here. Such then is the source of this conflict between the signification and the material of the external form in general; it is only the attempt, the effort, to stamp the inward Spirit upon the outward embodiment. The pyramid is an independent crystal, in which a dead man dwells ; in the work of art, which is pressing forward toward beauty, the inner soul is impressed upon the exter- nality of the form employed. What we have here is simply the impulse, because the signification and actual representation, the mental idea and the actual definite form of existence, are in fact opposed to one another in this difference, and this difference exists because subjectivity is, to begin with, merely universal, abstract, and is not yet concrete, filled up subjectivity. The Egyptian religion thus actually exists for us in Egyptian works of art, since what these tell us is bound up with what is historical, and which has been preserved to us by ancient historians. In recent times especially, the ruins of the land of Egypt have been explored in a variety of ways, and the dumb language of the statues, as also, of the mysterious hieroglyphics, has been studied. If we must recognise the superiority of a people which has laid up its Spirit in works of language over one which has only left dumb works of art behind it for DEFINITE RELIGION 121 posterity, we must at the same time recollect that here among the Egyptians no written documents are in exist- ence, for the reason that Spirit had not as yet clarified itself, as it were, but was struggling to clear itself of alien elements, and this in an external way, as appears in the works of art. At last, it is true, after prolonged study, advance has been made in the deciphering of hieroglyphics, but, on the one hand, there is still a part of this work which is unaccomplished, and on the other hand, they always remain hieroglyphics. Numerous rolls of papyrii have been found beside the mummies, and it was at first believed that a great treasure had been dis- covered in these, and that we had come upon important disclosures. These papyrii are, however, nothing else than a species of archives, and contain for the most part deeds of purchase regarding pieces of land, or have refer- ence to objects which the person deceased had acquired. It is, therefore, principally the extant works of art whose language we have to decipher, and from which a knowledge of this religion may be obtained. Now, if we contemplate these works of art, we find that everything in them is wonderful and fantastic, but always with a definite meaning, which was not the case among the peoples of India. We thus have the immediate- ness of externality here, and the meaning, the thought. We have all these elements together in the tremendous conflict of the inner with the outer ; there is a tremendous impulse on the part of what is inner to work itself free, and what is outer exhibits to us this struggle of Spirit. The form is not as yet exalted into form that is free and beautiful, not as yet spiritualised into clearness, transparency ; the sensuous, the natural, is not as yet so perfectly transfigured into the spiritual as to be merely an expression of the spiritual, so that this organisation and its features might be mere signs, merely the signi- fication of the spiritual. To the Egyptian principle this transparency of the natural, of the external element of 122 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION outward embodiment, is wanting ; what remains is only the task of becoming clear to self, and the spiritual con- sciousness as being the inner element merely seeks to struggle out of naturalness and be free. The most important representation by which the essen- tial nature of this struggle is made perfectly plain is the statue of the goddess at Sais, who was represented veiled. It is symbolised in that statue, and in the in- scription in her temple, " I nm what was, is, and shall be ; my veil has been lifted by no mortal," it is expressly declared that Nature is something differentiated within itself, namely, an Other in contrast to its outward ap- pearance as that immediately presents itself, an enigma. It has an inner element, something that is hidden. " But," it is stated further in this inscription, " the fruit of my body is Helios." This as yet hidden essence there- fore expresses clearness, the sun, the becoming clear to oneself, the spiritual sun in the form of the son who is born of her. It is this clearness which is attained to in the Greek and Jewish religion, in the former in art and in the beautiful human form, in the latter in objective thought. The enigma is solved ; the Egyptian Sphinx, according to a deeply significant and admirable myth, was slain by a Greek, and thus the enigma has been solved. This means that the content is man, free, self- knowing Spirit. SECOND DIVISION THE RELIGION OF SPIRITUAL INDIVIDUALITY. The Religion of Nature is the most difficult to get a grasp of, because it lies farthest from our ordinary thought, and is the crudest and most imperfect form of religion. The natural element has such a variety of shapes within itself, that in the form of naturalness and immediateness the universal absolute content is broken up. DEFINITE RELIGION 123 A. TRANSITION TO THE SPHERE OF SPIRITUAL INDIVIDUALITY. "What is higher is also deeper ; in it the separate moments are grasped together in the ideality of subjec- tive unity ; the want of connection which characterises immediacy is annulled, and the separate elements are brought back into subjective unity. For this reason it is necessary that what has the quality of naturalness should manifest such a multiplicity of outward shapes, which exhibit themselves as indifferent and mutually exclusive, as independent and individual forms of existence. The general characteristic is free subjectivity which has satisfied its impulse, its inner desire. It is free subjectivity which has attained to dominion over the finite generally, over the natural and finite elements of consciousness, whether physical or spiritual, so that now the subject, that is, Spirit as spiritual subject, becomes known in its relation to the natural and the finite, while the latter are in part merely subservient to Spirit, and in part the garment of Spirit, and are present concretely in Spirit. Further, as outwardly representing Spirit, the natural and finite merely serve as a manifestation and glorification of Spirit. Spirit in this freedom, power, reconciliation with itself, exists on its own account, free and untrammelled in the natural ; the external, the finite, is distinguished from these finite-natural and spiritual elements, from what belongs to the region of empirical, changeable consciousness, as well as to that of external existence. Such is the general fundamental characteristic of this stage. Spirit being free, and the finite only an ideal mo- ment in it, it is posited as inherently concrete, and inas- much as we look upon Spirit and the freedom of Spirit as concrete, what we have is rational Spirit ; the content constitutes the rationality of Spirit. 124 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION This deterruinateness first referred to, looked at from the point of view of its content, is in its formal aspect this, namely, that the natural, the finite, are simply wit- nesses to Spirit, are simply subservient to its manifesta- tion. Here we have the religion within which rational Spirit is the content. The next step in advance, therefore, is that the free form of subjectivity, the consciousness of the Divine, comes into view in an unalloyed and independent form, in the character of free subjectivity, so far as this can be in the first form of spirituality which has become free. That this last, however, is known exclusively for itself, or, in other words, that the Divine is determined on its own account as subjectivity, represents a purifying from the natural, which has been already referred to in the' previous discussion. The subject is exclusive ; it is the principle of infinite negativity, and since as regards its content it is universal, it leaves nothing existing inde- pendently beside it which is devoid of Spirit, or is merely natural ; and in like manner nothing which is merely substantial, essentially devoid of form. Subjectivity is infinite Form ; and as such, it no more leaves to Form which is not free, that is to say external naturalness, any independent existence along side of it, than it does to empty, pure, undetermined substantiality. The funda- mental determination is that God becomes known as freely determining Himself within Himself ; still formally, it is true, but yet already freely within Himself. We fire able to recognise this emergence of free subjectivity in religions and in the peoples to which such religions belong, principally by observing whether among such peoples universal laws, laws of freedom, justice, and morality, constitute fundamental determinations and have the predominance. God conceived of as subject is con- ceived of as spontaneously determining himself, i.e., His self-determinations are the laws of freedom ; they are the determinations of self-determination, and are of such DEFINITE RELIGION 125 a kind that their content belongs only to the form of free self-determination, and with this is necessarily connected the fact that freedom constitutes the content of the laws. When we perceive this, the element of naturalness or immediacy retires into the background, and inherently universal ends show themselves ends which are in- herently universal, although externally they may be quite unimportant, or, so far as their range is concerned, are not yet universal, just as a man who acts from ethical motives may perform his actions within a sphere extremely restricted, so far as its general content is con- cerned, and yet be essentially moral. The brighter sun of Spirit makes the natural light pale before it. Thus we pass outside of the circle of the Eeligion of Nature. We come to gods who are essentially founders of states and marriage, founders of peaceful life, producers of art which originates solely with them, gods who preside over oracles and states, and who originate and protect law and morality. The peoples who have reached that stage in the development of self-consciousness in which sub- jectivity is recognised to be the ideality of the natural, have thereby crossed over into the sphere of ideality, into the kingdom of the soul, and have come to the region belonging to the realm of Spirit. They have torn from their eyes the bandage of sensuous perception, escaped from the trackless maze which is devoid of thought, they have laid .hold of thought, of the Intel- lectual Sphere, and have made and secured for them- selves the solid ground in what is inward. They have laid the foundations of the sanctuary which in its very nature is firm and stable. The progress made up to this point has been as follows : We started from the natural desires as seen in the religion of magic, from the authority and power of these desires over Nature, gained simply by indi- vidual will which is not determined by thought. The second stage was occupied by the theoretical deterrni- 126 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION nation of the independence of objectivity, in which accordingly all the moments were set free and released, and reached the state of independence. In the third stage was found the theoretical or self-determining element, which took back into itself these moments thus released, so that the practical element is thus made theoretical, the Good self-determination, and, finally, the blending of substantiality and subjectivity. If we now ask, How has the idea of God been defined so far ? What is God ? What have we learned about Him ? The answer is as follows : In accordance with the abstract form of the meta- physical Notion we began thus : God is the unity of the Infinite and the Finite, and our sole concern is to find out how particularity and determinateness, i.e., the finite, is incorporated with the infinite. What result have we as regards this point so far reached ? God is the infinite in general, what is identical with itself, substantial power. When we start by saying this, it is not implied that fiuitude is as yet posited as contained in it, and it is, to begin with, the purely immediate exist- ence of the infinite self-consciousness. From the fact that God is just infinitude, substantial power, it follows, and it is consciously implied in it, that the substantial Power alone is the truth of finite things, and that their truth consists only in this, that they return into the substantial unity. God is thus, to begin with, the Power referred to, a definition which, being purely abstract, is extremely imperfect. The second position is that God is the substantial Power in Himself, pure Being-for-self, separate from the manifoldness of the finite. This is substantiality which is reflected into itself, and this is the essential conception of God. With this idea of sub- stantiality which exists within itself and distinguishes itself from the finite, we have reached higher ground, but here the determination of the true relation of the finite to the substantial Power, whereby the latter would DEFINITE RELIGION 127 itself corne to be tbe infinite, does not yet exist. This inherently existing substantiality is accordingly Brahma, and the independently existing finite is represented by the many gods. The third position is that in which the finite is posited as identical with substantiality, so that its sphere is of similar extent to that of the latter, and is pure universal form, as substantiality itself is. This is God conceived of as The Good. Spiritual subjectivity, the conception at which we have how arrived, is the absolutely free power of self- determination, so that this is nothing else than the Notion, and has no content but the Notion ; and in this self-determination there is nothing beyond the fact that it contains itself. This self-determination, this content, is accordingly as universal, as infinite, as the Power itself. This universal Power, which now shows itself active in the form of self-determination, we may call Wisdom. In so far as we have to do with spiritual subjectivity we have to do with self-determination, with an end, and these are as universal as the Power, and are thus wise ends. Determination in accordance with an end is directly involved in the conception of free sub- jectivity. Action which is in accordance with an end is inner self-determination, i.e., it is determination by means of freedom, by means of the subject, for there is nothing within but just the subject itself. This self-determination maintains itself in external existence, natural being has no longer any worth in its immediacy, it belongs to the Power, is a transparent medium for it, and has no value for itself. In so far as it takes on an external form and it must externalise itself, subjectivity must give itself reality it is simply free self-determination which maintains itself in realising itself, in external existence, in the natural sphere. In the case of action which is in conformity with an end, nothing comes out of it unless what is already there. Immediate existence, on the other hand, is bereft of power, i;8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION as it were, is form only, is the mode only in which the end is present in it, and it is the end which is the inner element. We find ourselves here accordingly in the sphere of the End, and action which is in conformity with an end is wise action, since wisdom consists in acting according to ends which hold good universally ; and no other con- tent is actually present in it, for it is free subjectivity which determines itself. The general conception here is that of subjectivity, of power which works in accordance with ends, which is active in fact. Subjectivity, speaking generally, consists in being active, and the end must be a wise one, it must be identical with what determines it, with the unlimited Power. i. What we have first to consider here is the relation of the subject to Nature, to natural things, and more particularly to what we previously called Substantiality, the Power which has only potential being. This remains something inward, but subjectivity is Power which has independent actual being, and is different from Power which has potential being and from its reality, namely, Nature. This Power which has potential being, Nature, is now degraded to the condition of something powerless, something dependent relatively to the underived Power, or, to put it more definitely, it is made a means. Natural things are deprived of their own independent existence. Hitherto they had a direct share in Substance, while now they are in the subjective Power separated from substan- tiality, distinguished from it, and are regarded as only negative. The unity of the subjective Power is outside of them, is distinguished from them. They are only means or modes which have no more value beyond serving for manifestation ; they are the material of manifestation and are subject to what manifests itself in them ; they may no longer show themselves directly, but must reveal a something higher in them, namely, free subjectivity. DEFINITE RELIGION 129 2. But what is the more definite determination con- nected with the idea of wisdom ? It is, to begin with, undetermined so far as the end is concerned. We do not as yet know of what it consists, what the ends of this Power are, and do not go beyond the undefined phrase, the wisdom of God. God is wise, but what are His ways, His ends ? In order that we may be able to say what they are, the ends must be already before us in all their determinateness and definiteness, i.e., in their development as a distinction of moments. So far we have here only determination in accordance with ends in general. 3. Since God is above all things real, we cannot, in considering Him, stop short at this indeterminateness in wisdom. The ends must be determined. God as subject manifests Himself, acts, which means that He comes forward into actual existence, into reality. At an earlier stage the unity of infinitude and finitude was regarded as simply immediate, and was thus the first and best of finite things, sun, hill, river, &c., and the reality was of an immediate kind. Here it is also necessary that God be in a definite place, i.e., that His end be definite and determined. In reference to the reality of the end there are two points which call for notice. The first is contained in the question, What is the sphere in which this end can be present ? The end, as being something inward, is merely subjective, is only thought or idea. God, how- ever, as subjective Power, is not simply will, intention, &c., but rather immediate Cause. This sphere of the realisation of the actual existence of the end is self-con- sciousness or the finite spirit. End is determination in general, and here we have determinations which are merely abstract and not as yet developed. The finite spirit is accordingly the sphere in which the divine end shows itself. Since it is only now that we first reach the thought of the determination of wisdom in general, VOL. n. I 130 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION we have not any content, anything definite, whereby to express what is wise. The end is potential, is yet un- determined in the notion of God, and so we have to take a second and further step, and show that the end must become actual, must be realised. There must, therefore, be determination in it, but the determination is not as yet developed. The determination as such, the develop- ment, has not as yet taken an actual form within the Divine Essence, and for this reason the determination is finite, external, an accidental or particular end. In so far as it exists, it exists in an undefined form in the divine notion, but so far as it is determined it is an accidental and entirely limited end ; or, to put it otherwise, what constitutes it is something outside of the divine notion, an end which can be distinguished from it, not the divine end in all its completeness in and for itself, i.e., not an end which would be developed from its own inner nature, and would in its particular forms express the determi- nateness of the divine notion. In studying the Religion of Nature, we saw that in it goodness was as universal as power; but speaking gene- rally, it does not go beyond expressing the idea of sub- stantial immediate identity with the Divine Essence, and all things accordingly are good and full of light. Here, in the determination of subjectivity, of Power which has independent existence, the end is distinguished from the notion, and the definite form given to the end is just for this reason merely accidental, because the difference has not yet been taken back into the divine notion, is not yet considered as equivalent to it. Here, therefore, we have only ends which, so far as their contents are concerned, are finite, and are not as yet adequate to express the divine notion. Finite self-consciousness is thus, to begin with, the region in which they are realised. This is the fundamental characteristic of the standpoint we have got to. DEFINITE RELIGION 131 B. THE METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTION OR NOTION OF THIS SPHERE. It is the pure abstract thought-determination which forms the basis here. We abstract as yet from idea or mental representation, as also from the necessity of the realisation of the Notion, a necessity which does not exactly belong to idea, but is rather one which the Notion itself renders necessary. Here we have the metaphysical notion in its relation to the form taken by the Proofs of the Existence of God. The special charac- teristic of the metaphysical notion, as contrasted with the foregoing, lies in this, that in the case of the latter we started from the unity of the Infinite and the finite. The Infinite was absolute negativity, undeveloped Power, and the thought involved in the first sphere and its essence were limited to this definition of infinitude. In that sphere the notion, so far as we are concerned, was un- doubtedly that of the unity of the finite and the Infinite ; but in reference to this stage itself, the Essence was defined simply as the Infinite. This latter forms the basis, and the finite was merely added to it; and just for this reason the determination assumed a natural aspect, and was accordingly the Eeligion of Nature, because the form required natural existence in order to show itself in a definite actual shape. The Eeligion of Nature already proved also the inadequacy of what is immediately ex- ternal to express what is internal. In the conception of the Immeasurable it passed beyond the immediate identity of the natural and the Absolute, and also beyond that of immediate Being and Essence. But the external form when stretched out to the Immeasurable snaps, as it were, natural Being vanishes, and begins to exist for itself as the Universal. Infinitude is not yet, however, imma- nent determination, and, in order to represent it, use is 132 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION still made of natural forms which are external and inade- quate. In proportion as the Natural is posited as exist- ing negatively in the Immeasurable, is it also positive looked at in its finite existence, as opposed to the Infinite. Or, to put it otherwise, the Immeasurable, which, in pro- portion as everything disappears within it, is in like pro- portion also powerless, is the contradiction of Power and powerlessness. In contrast to this, we have now the Essence itself defined as the unity of the Infinite and the finite, as true Power, as infinitude which is concrete in itself, i.e., as the unity of the finite and the Infinite. It is this, accordingly, that we have in the determination of wisdom which is the Power which determines itself within itself, and this determination is the finite aspect, and thus the Divine is known as what is concrete in itself, inherently infinite form. This form is the aspect of the finite as potential, but posited here under the aspect of the Infinite. In the concrete ideality of the Essence the contradiction referred to as existing in the Immeasurable is done away with, since the Essence is a manifestation of itself for itself, and not an abstract being- for-self. Posited as Power, it is the absolute negativity which differentiates itself, but in such a way that the differences are done away with, and are only a sem- blance. That is powerful which has the soul, the Idea of the " Other," which the Other is in its immediacy only. Whatever thinks that which the " Others " only are, con- stitutes their Power. The Essence (not a particular Essence or one higher Essence) i.e., the Universe as absolute Power is satisfied in itself and is Totality, since all other determinations are taken up into and absorbed in it. In order to be, it does not have recourse to natural objects, but has a determinate character of its own within itself, and is the totality of its appearance or semblance. Since thus the determination of pure thought belongs to the determining or characterisation of the Essence itself, it follows that further advance in characterisation DEFINITE RELIGION 133 is not connected with the natural mode or aspect of things, but takes place within the Essence itself. If, accordingly, we are to find three stages here, then they constitute an advance within the metaphysical notion itself. They are moments in the Essence, different forms of the notion for the religious self-consciousness which occupies this standpoint. At an earlier stage the ad- vance was merely in the external form, here the advance is within the notion itself. Now, the Divine Essence is actual Essence, Essence for itself, and the differences are its own reflection of itself into itself. We thus get three conceptions. The first is that of Unity, the second that of Necessity, the third that of Conforrnability to an End, though of conformability which is finite and external. We have (a.) Unity, absolute Power, negativity, which is posited as reflected into itself, as existing absolutely for self, or as absolute subjectivity, so that here, in this particular form of essential being, the sense element is directly abolished. It is Power which is actual, for itself, and has within it nothing belonging to sense, for this latter is the finite, which has not yet been taken up into, is not yet absorbed by, the Infinite. Here, however, it is in process of being absorbed. This subjectivity, which is actual, which exists for itself, is accordingly the One. We have (5.) Necessity. The One is this absolute Power, and everything is posited in it as merely negative. This constitutes the conception or notion of the One. But when we express it thus, development is not as yet postulated. The One is nothing more than the form of simplicity, and necessity then comes to be the process of unity itself. It is the unity as inner movement, and is no longer the One, the unit, but the unity. The move- ment which constitutes the Notion is the unity, the absolute necessity. We have (c.) Conformability to an End. In absolute necessity is posited or made explicit the movement which 134 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION the One is only implicitly. It is the process, and it is the process of contingent things, for it is contingent things which are thus posited and negated. In necessity, how- ever, it is only the transition, the coming and going of things, which is posited. But now it must be further posited that these things exist and appear as distinguished from this unity of theirs, from this process of necessity which belongs to them. They must appear, at all events, momentarily as existing, and at the same time as belonging to the power out of which they do not pass. They are thus means in general, and the unity consists in this, that it maintains itself within this process which belongs to it, and produces itself in these means. This is the unity of necessity itself, but thought of as distinguished from what moves itself, and within which it maintains itself, so that it has the element of Being only as something negative. Unity is thus End in general. These three points stand in the following relation to each other. Since the Essence is absolute negativity, it is pure identity with itself, the One ; it is at the same time the negativity of the unity, which, however, is in a relation to the unity, and owing to this interpenetration of both shows itself as necessity. In the third place, the One returns into itself out of the isolation of its difference, a unity, nevertheless, which, as being this self- absorption of the Form into itself, has a finite content, and in this way, by developing into the difference of the Form as totality, gives us the conception of con for in ability to an end, a conformability which is, however, finite. When it is said that in this are contained the three metaphysical notions or conceptions of the three religions, it is not to be supposed that each of these conceptions belongs to one religion only. On the contrary, each of these three determinations or characteristics belongs to all three. Where One is the Essence, there too is necessity though only implicit, not in its determinate quality ; and so, too, if the One determines Himself in DEFINITE RELIGION 135 accordance with ends, then He is wise. Necessity is One also, and conformability to an end is present here also, only it lies outside of necessity. If conformability to an end is the fundamental characteristic, we have along with this the presence of the Power to carry out the ends, and the end itself is Fate. The point of difference simply is as to which of these determinations of the object is to be regarded as the Essence, and whether this latter is the One, or Necessity, or Power with its ends. The point of difference is simply as to which of them is to pass as the fundamental determination of the Essence for each religion. What we have now to consider more definitely is the form in which these determinations appear as they have been connected with the proofs of the existence of God. (a.) The Conception of the One. Here we have not got to do with the proposition, God is only one ; for it is implied in these words that the One is only a predicate of God ; we have the subject, God, and a predicate outside of which He may have others in addition to this. That God is only One is a proposi- tion which it is not difficult to prove. Being passes over into Essence, and this reflected into itself is what has been frequently called an Ens, or Individuum. When we say, God is the One, we mean something different from what was expressed formerly in the words, The Absolute Being is One, TO eV. Parmenides expressed it thus : Being alone is, or the One only is. This One, however, is only the abstract Infinite, not the Infinite as reflected into itself, and is thus rather the Immeasur- able and Powerless, for it is the Infinite only as com- pared with actual existence in its infinitely manifold forms, and its existence is necessarily dependent on this relation. Power at first conceived of as the One is in reality the Universal posited as Power. The abstract One is the one side, and over against it is the manifold- ness of the essence of the world. The concrete One, on )3$ THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION the other hand, is individuality, the Universal, \vhat is reflected into itself, the other side of which itself com- prises all being in itself, so that it has returned into its own unity. Reflection accordingly conceives of the unity of God as a characteristic quality, and seeks to demonstrate it. This, however, does not supply the form in which to express a proof of the existence of God. The One is distinguished from the substratum, and the point is simply to exhibit the characteristic of Being as One. Reflection lights upon this idea because One is just reflection into self. Accordingly this characteristic or determination that God is only One has reference, to begin with, only to the Many with which it is contrasted, and so far also to the other Form, which will be dealt with as the second Form belonging to this stage. The disproof of the determina- tion which comes later is thus given here in advance. This second form in itself and in the determination of its notion is undoubtedly more concrete; but as definite or determined Being in and for itself when it appears as Necessity is only something that ought to be, an ideal, and because it is only what ought to be is thus multi- plicity, it has not as yet absolute reflection-into-self, and it is wanting in the characteristic of being One. Doubt- less the characteristic of the One is also as yet one-sided, since it is only the abstract form in an actual state, for itself, and is not the developed form in the shape of content. The development of the necessity of this characteristic of the One, the rising up to this one Subject as the One, is carried out thus. Being as One is conceived of as predicate, while God is presupposed as subject, and it is then shown that the characteristic of multiplicity is op- posed to the presupposition of this subject. The relation belonging to the Many can thus be considered as consist- ing in their reference to each other; they are then thought DEFINITE RELIGION 137 of as coming into contact with each other, and getting into conflict with themselves. This conflict is, however, the appearance of the contradiction itself in an immediate way, for the different gods have to maintain themselves in accordance with their own nature or quality, and it is here that their finitude comes to light. In so far as God is presupposed as being the Universal or the Essence, that finitude which is involved in the multiplicity is inadequate to express what is contained in that presupposition. In the case of finite things we are accustomed to think that substances may be in conflict without losing their independence. It would seem, then, that it is only their superficial elements which they send out to engage in the conflict, while they keep their real selves in the background. In accordance with this a distinction is made between the inner nature of the subject and its relations, between the substance considered in reference to others and the substance as passive, without prejudice to its aforesaid activity. This distinction is as yet un- proved. What the many are so far as content and power are concerned, they are only in contrast with something else ; their Being, as reflected into self, is simply some- thing devoid of content. If they are thus, so far as form also is concerned, independent, they are, nevertheless, finite so far as the content is concerned, and this succumbs to the same process of dialectic as that to which finite Being has to yield. In face of the presupposition of ab- solute Power, of the universal negativity of all that has Being, the multiplicity of such formal finite things accord- ingly directly disappears. It is directly involved in the presupposition of the Universal, that form and content cannot be so separated that a quality can attach to the one which is wanting to the other. Thus the gods by means of their qualities directly cancel each other. Multiplicity is, however, in this case taken also in the sense of pure difference which does not come in contact with itself. Thus we speak of a multiplicity of worlds 138 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION which do not come into conflict and are not in contra- diction with each other. Ordinary thought obstinately clings to this idea by maintaining that the truth of such a presupposition cannot be controverted because no con- tradiction is involved in it. It is, however, really one of the ordinary bad forms of Reflection to say that it is possible to form an idea of anything. It is certainly possible to form to oneself an idea of everything, and to conceive of it as possible ; but that does not mean any- thing at all. If it be asked wherein the difference con- sists, and if the answer is that the one is as powerful as the other, and that no one of them is to have qualities which the other also has not, then the difference is an empty phrase. The difference must necessarily directly advance till it becomes a definite or determined difference, and in that case, so far as our reflection is concerned, there is wanting to the one what is peculiar to the other, but only in so far as our reflection is concerned. Thus the stone, in so far as we reflect upon it, is not so perfect as the plant, yet there is no defect in the stone considered in itself ; it neither feels nor knows anything of its defect. Thus the difference spoken of is only an idea in our mind, in our reflection. It is in this way, therefore, that Reflection reasons, and its reasoning is correct, but all the same it is likewise inadequate. The Universal, the Essence, is presupposed under the form of Power, and it is asked if the predicate of the One attaches to it. The determination of the One is nevertheless already in harmony with the presuppo- sition, for absolute Power is directly contained in the determination of individuality, of oneness, or the One. The proof is thus quite correct but superfluous, and what is overlooked is that the absolute Power itself is already contained in the definition or determination of the One. To prove predicates of God is really not the business of the Notion, nor is God in this way to be known philo- sophically. DEFINITE RELIGION 139 But as a matter of fact, the true meaning of this notion is not contained in the proposition that God is One, but rather in the statement that the One is God, so that the One exhausts the meaning of this Divine Essence, and is not a predicate. Nor is it a characteristic along with other characteristics, but, on the contrary, it is one which fully expresses the Essence in the sense of absolute Power as subjectivity, as reflected into itself. God is thus just this movement of the subject from itself and back to itself, the self-determination of itself as the One in such a way that subject and predicate are the same, are this movement within each other, so that there is nothing left which comes between them. This notion is not adapted to be expressed in the form of a mediation in which the notion will appear as a proof of the exist- ence of God, for it is the Infinite, the absolute negativity from which we start in order to reach the determination of the One. The One is merely the determination which is attached to it, and which expresses the thought that this is subjectivity reflected into itself. The movement proceeds, so to speak, only within the potential Being of the Infinite. It is, therefore, not in the form of mediation that we have to consider it here. We certainly might say there is an advance from the Infinite to subjectivity determined within itself, but the beginning is the- Infi- nite, and this Infinite, moreover, as the absolute nega- tivity, is the Subject reflected into itself, in which all that is manifold is done away with and absorbed. If we wished to look at the mediation more closely, we would start from one thought and conceive of the Notion in and for itself as Thought, and from this we would go on to the Other, to Being. But here we cannot start from the Notion, for a beginning in this form gives a different proof of the existence of God, and one which belongs to the Christian religion, and not to the religion under consideration. The One is not yet thought of as Notion, not yet thought of as Notion for us ; what is 140 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION true, posited concretely in itself, such as we have in the Christian religion, is not as yet present here. Since the Absolute is thus denned as the One and as Power, self-consciousness is merely a semblance of the Absolute. It is certainly something for which the Abso- lute manifests itself, and to which it stands in a positive relation, for the reflection of Power into itself directly gives repulsion, and this is self-consciousness, and thus personality. Self-consciousness begins here to have a certain value, but still it has only an abstract determi- nation, so that self-consciousness in its concrete form knows itself merely as a semblance of existence. It is in bondage, has no extended sphere in itself, no room in which to act ; heart and mind are hemmed in ; what feel- ing it has consists only in feeling the Lord ; it has its existence and finds its happiness only within this narrow enclosure. Even if, as is the case here, the element of difference comes to light, still it is held fast ; it does not really break away, and is not set free. Self-consciousness concentrates itself only in this one point, and though it knows itself as essentially existing for it is not killed as in Brahma it is at the same time the non-essential element in the Essence. (b.) Necessity is something which is self-posited as mediation, and is here accordingly a mediation for self- consciousness. Necessity is movement, implicit process, implying that the accidental element in things and in the world is definitely characterised as accidental, and thus raises itself to and disappears in necessity. When in any religion the absolute Essence is conceived of, or known, or revered as Necessity, then this process is pre- sent. It might seem as if we had seen this transition already in the advance of the finite to the Infinite in the fact that the truth of the finite was the Infinite, the absorption of the finite in itself into the Infinite, and that in the same way the accidental also returns into necessity. Whether we regard the determination of the DEFINITE RELIGION 141 advance of the finite to the Infinite or of the accidental to Necessity, the distinction, so far as the advance is concerned, does not seem at all to be an essential one. As a matter of fact, both have the same fundamental determination, so that, from one point of view, this is correct ; but if we regard the matter from another point of view, the difference or distinction is more concrete than that of the earlier form of the process. That is to say, if we begin from the finite, then the matter stands thus ; but the first beginning is that it has real worth, that it exists as Being, or, in other words, we take it to begin with in an affirmative, positive form. Its end is indeed involved in it, but at the same time it still pos- sesses immediate Being. " Accidental " already suggests something more concrete, for what is accidental can either be or not be. The Real is accidental, for it may quite as well be possibility, the Being of which lias the value of Not-Being. Thus there is posited in the accidental the negation of itself, and it is accordingly a transition from Being into Nothing. Like the finite, it is inherently negative ; but since it is also Not-Being, so too is it the transition from Not- Being to Being. The characteristic or determination of contingency is thus much richer and more concrete than that of the finite. The truth of con- tingency is necessity, and this is determinate existence, which has arisen by mediation with itself through its Not- Being. Eeality is a definite form of existence of this sort, in the case of. which the process is-shut in within itself, and which by means of itself domes into harmony with itself. In connection with Necessity we have, however, to make the following distinctions : i. External necessity is in a peculiar sense contingent necessity. When an effect is dependent on causes, then it is necessary ; when one or another set of circumstances concurs, then one or another -result must follow. Only circumstances which occasion this are immediate ; and since, regarded from this standpoint, immediate Being has 1 42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION merely the value of possibility, the" circumstances are such as may or may not be, and so the necessity is relative, and is related thus to the circumstances which constitute the beginning, and which are accordingly immediate and contingent. This is external necessity, which has no higher value than that possessed by contingency. It is possible to demonstrate external necessity in such a way as to show that this or the other thing is necessary, but the circumstances always remain contingent; they can exist, but they can also not exist. A tile may fall from the roof and kill a man, but the falling down of the tile, the concurrence, may be or may not be ; it is contingent. In this external necessity it is the result only which is necessary ; the circumstances are contingent. These two, the conditioning causes and the results, are for this reason different. The one is determined as contingent, the other as necessary ; this is the difference considered abstractly, but there is also a concrete difference. Something results quite different from what was posited ; and since the forms are different, so too the content of the two sides is different. The tile falls accidentally ; the person who is killed, the particular concrete subject, his death, and that act of falling down, are entirely heterogeneous, have a perfectly different content ; something appears as result which is entirely different from what was posited. When life is considered according to the conditions of external necessity as a result of soil, heat, light, air, moisture, &c., as a product of these conditions, what is implied is that the matter is being looked at from the point of view of external necessity. This latter has to be carefully dis- tinguished from the true inner necessity. 2. The inner necessity consists just in this, that everything of the nature of cause, occasion, occasioning circumstance, is presupposed and definitely distinguished, and the result belongs to One. The necessity puts to- gether the two elements into one unity. All that takes place in this necessity takes place in such a way that DEFINITE RELIGION 143 nothing results from the presupposed condition, which is different from these, but rather the process is of such a kind that whatever is presupposed appears also in the result, coincides with itself, finds itself; or, to put it otherwise, the two moments of immediate existence, and of its being posited, are posited as one moment. In external necessity contingency is substantial or imme- diate existence. What is, is not as being something posited, the conditions do not belong to the unity, they are immediate, and the result is only something posited, is not Being. The effect is what is posited, the cause is what is underived. In the true necessity these are a unity ; the circumstances exist, but they not only are, they are also posited by means of the unity, are, as a matter of fact, contingent, but are this in themselves ; in that they cancel themselves the negation of their Being is the unity of necessity, so that their Being is one which is implicitly negated. The result is, accordingly, not only result, or only something posited, but it is just because of what thus takes place that the result comes to have Being. Necessity is thus the positing of the conditions, they are themselves posited by means of the unity; the result is also something posited, and is this indeed by means of reflection, by means of the process, by means of the reflection of the unity into itself; this unity is therefore the Being of the result. Thus what- ever takes place within necessity simply comes into har- mony with itself. The unity projects itself outward, disperses itself in circumstances which appear as if they were contingent; the unity of itself projects its con- ditions as if they were innocent of any connection with it^ as if they were, so to speak, ordinary stones which appear in an immediate way, and rouse no suspicion of their being anything else. In the second stage they are posited, they do not belong to themselves, but to an " Other," to their result. They are thus broken up in themselves, and the manifestation of their nature as 144 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION posited is their self-abrogation, the production of an " Other," the result, namely, which, however, appears as an " Other " only as opposed to their existence in a scat- tered form. The content, however, is one ; the result is what they implicitly are, only the mode and manner of their appearance are altered. The result is the sum of what is contained in the circumstances, and the mani- festation of this in a definite form. It is Life which thus projects its own conditions, means of stimulus, impulses, though in that form they do not look as if they were Life, for the inner element, what is implicit, appears first in the result. Necessity is thus the Process which implies that the result and the preliminary condition are different only as regards their form. If we now consider this form and how necessity has come to get the definite shape of a Proof of the exist- ence of God, we see that the content is the true Notion. Necessity is the truth of the contingent world. The more detailed development of this thought belongs to Logic. The notion of God is the absolute necessity ; this is a necessary and essential standpoint, not indeed the highest or the really true one, but one from which the higher proceeds, and which is a condition of the higher notion which itself presupposes it. Thus the Absolute is necessity. The notion of absolute necessity does not yet correspond to the Idea which we must have of God, but which, however, is to be presupposed in the form of a pictorial or general idea. The higher notion or grasp has to grasp, to comprehend itself. There is here a defect in this Proof of the existence of God. So far as the form of the Proof is concerned in reference to absolute necessity, we find it to be the well-known Cosmological Proof, which is expressed simply thus : contingent things presuppose an absolutely necessary Cause, but contingent things exist, I and the World are such, therefore there is an absolutely necessary Cause. The defective element in this Proof is easily seen. DEFINITE RELIGION 145 The major proposition runs thus : Contingent things pre- suppose an absolutely necessary Cause ; this proposition, taken in a general sense, is quite correct, and expresses the connection between what is contingent and what is necessary, and, in order to obviate captious criticisms which would otherwise be made, one does not require to say they presuppose an absolutely necessary Cause, for this expresses a relation between finite things ; but we can say they presuppose the absolutely necessary in such a way that this is conceived of as Subject. The pro- position, accordingly, further contains a contradiction in reference to external necessity. Contingent things have causes ; they are necessary, that by means of which they exist in this form may itself be contingent only, and so we are referred back from the cause to contingent things in endless progression. The proposition cuts short this style of reasoning, and is perfectly justified in doing so. What is only contingently necessary would be no necessity at all, and the real necessity stands in contrast to that implied in this proposition. The connection is in a general way correctly expressed too, contingent things presuppose absolute necessity ; but the mode of the con- nection is incomplete, the union being defined as some- thing presupposed or demanded. This is a connection belonging to untutored reflection, and implies that con- tingent things are placed on one side and necessity on the other, and thus while a transition is made from the one to the other, both sides are firmly opposed to each other. Owing to the fixity of Being in this form, con- tingent things become the conditions of the Being of necessity. This is still more plainly expressed in the minor proposition : There are contingent things, conse- quently there is an absolutely necessary Cause. Since the connection is thus constituted in such a way that one form of Being conditions the other, it would seem to be implied in this that contingent things condition absolute necessity ; the one conditions the other, and VOL. II. K 146 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION thus necessity appears as if it were something whose existence is presupposed as dependent on or conditioned by contingent things. Absolute necessity is in this way put in a position of dependence, so that contingent things remain outside of it. The true connection is as follows. Contingent things exist, but their Being has the value merely of possibility ; they are and pass away ; they are themselves simply pre- posited, or have hypothetical existence through the process of unity. Their first moment consists in their becoming posited with the semblance of immediate existence ; their second moment consists in their being negated, in their being therefore conceived of essentially as appearance. In the Process they are essential moments, and so it may be said that they are the essential condition of absolute necessity. In the finite world it is true we start from some such immediate form of Being, but in the true world external necessity is simply the appearance referred to, and what is immediate is merely something posited, de- pendent on something else. It is this which constitutes the defect in mediations of this kind which pass for proofs of the existence of God. The really true content consists in this, that the Absolute must come to be recognised as absolute necessity. 3. Finally, absolute necessity actually is and contains in itself Freedom ; for it consists just in this, that it comes together with, comes into harmony with itself; ife is absolutely for itself, is not dependent on another ; its action is free, is simply the act of meeting with or coinciding with itself, its process consists simply in its finding itself ; but this is just freedom. Implicitly, neces- sity is free ; it is only by an illusion that the distinction is made between it and what results from it. We see this in the case of punishment. Punishment comes upon a man as an evil, as force, as the exercise of power which is foreign to him, and in which he does not find himself. It appears as external necessity, as something external DEFINITE RELIGION 147 which falls upon him, and something different from what he has done results from it ; punishment follows on his action, but it is something different from, other than, what he willed himself. If, however, a man comes to recognise punishment as just, then it is the consequence and the law of his own act of will which is bound up with his act itself. It is the rationality of his act which comes to him under the semblance of an " other ; " he has not to submit to any kind of force ; he bears his own deed, feels himself to be free in it, it is his own which cornes to him, justice, the rational element in what he has done. It is only, however, implicitly that necessity contains freedom, and this is an essential circumstance. It is only formal freedom, subjective freedom, and this means that necessity has not as yet any content in itself. Just because necessity is the simple act of coming together with itself, is it freedom. We require in connec- tion with it movement, circumstances, &c. This belongs to mediation, but when we say, This is necessary, then this is a unity; whatever is necessary, is; this is the simple expression, the result, in which the process has come together or coincided with itself. It expresses simple relation to itself, the act of finding itself; necessity is what is freest ; it is not determined or limited by any- thing ; all mediations are once more taken up into it and done away with. Necessity is the mediation which freely yields itself up; it is implicitly freedom. The feeling which finds expression in submitting to necessity, as it existed among the Greeks, and as it still exists amongst the Mohammedans, certainly contains freedom in it, but it is only potential or formal freedom : in presence of the necessity here, no content, no purpose, nothing definite has any value, and it is in this that its defect lies. Necessity, according to the higher conception and notion of it, real necessity, is thus just freedom as such, it is the Notion as such ; or, more definitely characterised, it is the 148 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION End. Necessity, in short, is without content, or, to put it otherwise, the difference contained in it is not yet posited ; it is the process which we have seen, simple Becoming, which only is to contain differences, and therefore what is contained in it, though it is certainly difference, is difference which is not as yet posited. It is something which coincides with itself though only through media- tion, and in this way difference in general is posited. It is, to begin with, only abstract self-determination ; the determinateness or specialisation is merely something which is to be. In order that the determinateness be real, it is necessary that the specialisation and the dif- ference should, in the act of coinciding with self, be posited as being able to hold out against the transition which goes on in the process, as maintaining themselves in the necessity. To posit is to give determinateness, and this determinateness, accordingly, is what coincides with itself; it is the content which maintains itself. This act of coinciding, thus characterised as content which maintains itself, is End. In this specialisation or determinateness which takes place in the process of coinciding or coming together, there are two forms of determinateness to be noticed. The determinateness appears as content which main- tains itself going through the process without undergoing alteration, and in the act of transition remaining equal to itself. Accordingly, so far as the determinateness is that of Form, it appears here in the shape of subject and object. The content is, to begin with, subjectivity, and the process means that it realises itself in the form of objectivity. This realised end is end, the content remains what it was ; it is subjective, but at the same time objective as well. (c.) We have thus arrived at the idea of conformity to an end ; it is in the end that the definite existence of the notion in general begins, the Free existing as free Being which is at home with itself, what maintains itself, DEFINITE RELIGION 149 or, to put it more definitely, the Subject. The Subject determines itself within itself; this determination, re- garded from one point of view, is content, and the Subject is free in it, is at home with itself, is free from the content, it is its own content, and the content has value only in so far as the Subject permits. This is the Notion taken generally. The Subject, however, also gives realisation to the Notion. The particularity thus acquired is at first simple, it is held within the Notion in the form of Being which is at home with itself, and which has re- turned back into itself. This subjectivity, although it is totality, is still at the same time one-sided subjective merely, only one moment of the entire form. The char- acteristic here is that the content is posited only in the form of the equality of what coincides with itself. This form thus defined as that which coincides with itself is the simple form of identity with self, and the Subject is the totality of Being as thus at home with itself. But so far as the Subject is concerned, that specialisation whereby it has an end is opposed to totality, and the Subject accordingly seeks to do away with this form and to realise the end. The realised end, however, remains attached to the Subject ; the latter possesses its own self in it, has objectified itself, set itself free from its single- ness or simplicity, while at the same time maintaining itself in its manifoldness. This is the conception or notion of conformity to an end. The world has now to be regarded as being in conformity to an end. We had previously the charac- terisation that things are contingent, but the higher characterisation is the teleological view of the world, the thought of its conformity to an end. It is possible to accept the first of these characterisations and yet to be in doubt as to whether we ought to consider things as being in conformity to an end, whether some of them are to be regarded as ends to which other things are 150 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION related as means, and it may be maintained that what appears as an end may have been merely produced mechanically under external conditions. It is here, in fact, that characterisation of a permanent sort begins. The end maintains itself in the process ; it begins and ends, it is something permanent, something exempted from the process, and which has its basis in the subject. The contrasted points of view may, accord- ingly, be put thus. Are we to keep to the point of view from which things are regarded as determined by other things, i.e., by the element of contingency in them, by external necessity, or to that from which they are regarded as determined by the end ? It has been already remarked that external necessity stands in contrast to the end, is something which is posited by, whose existence depends on, an " Other ; " the concurrence of circumstances is the producing factor, something different is the result; the end, on the other hand, is what remains, what gives the impulse, what is active, what realises itself. The con- ceptions of external necessity and conformity to an end are mutually opposed. We saw that external necessity returns back into the absolute necessity which is its Truth, that this is im- plicitly freedom, and that whatever is implicit must be posited. This characteristic appears as subjectivity and objectivity, and thus we get the idea of End. "We must therefore say, that in so far as things exist for us in im- mediate consciousness, in reflected consciousness, they are to be characterised as in conformity to an end, as having an end in themselves. The teleological view of things is an essential one ; but this way of regarding things is at once seen to have in it a distinction, that between inner and outer necessity, and the inner again can itself, in accordance with its content, be a finite conformity to an end, and thus it comes to be once more included within the relation of external conformity to an end. i . External Conformity to an End. Suppose an end has DEFINITE RELIGION 151 been posited in any kind of way and has to be realised, then in so far as the subject together with its ends is something finite, is an immediate definite form of existence, the further characteristic of realisation lies outside of it. It is, looked at from one point of view, immediate, and in that case the subject, together with its ends, is immediate, and the aspect under which realisation presents itself is an external one, i.e., the realisation appears as material, as something which has been got outside, and serves simply to realise the end. It is, in fact, merely a means in reference to the end, and it is the latter which firmly maintains itself and is permanent. Being as an " Other," Being in the aspect of reality, the material, is, as com- pared with the fixed end, something which has no inde- pendence of its own, has no actual Being, but is simply a means with no soul in it. The end is outside of it and is first impressed upon it by the activity of the subject, which realises itself in the material. External conformity to an end has thus an objectivity outside of it which has no independence, and in contrast to which the subject, together with its ends, is what is permanent. The material has no power to offer resistance, but is simply a means for the end which realises itself in it, and in the same way the realised end is itself merely an external form in the material, for this latter is something which has been immediately got, and is therefore dependent, though it is independent as well. In their union, therefore, both of them, means and end, remain external to one another. Wood and stones are means, but the realised end is equally wood and stones which have received a certain form ; but all the same the material is still something external to the end. 2. Inner Conformity to an End. This is the confor- mity which has its means in itself. Thus what has life is an end for itself, it makes itself into an end, and here the end is also the means. What has life is marked by this simple inwardness, which realises itself in its parts or 152 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION members; it is an articulated organism, an organism with differentiated members. Since the subject produces itself within itself, it has as its aim to have its means within itself. Each is a part or member and maintains itself, and is the means whereby the others are produced and maintained ; it is consumed and consumes ; it is this form, and not the material particles, which remains and main- tains itself in this process. Life is thus an end in itself. But it now further appears that the end, which is end for itself, stands at the same time in relation to external conformity to an end. Organic life has relations to in- organic Nature, and finds in it the means through which it maintains itself, and these means exist independently so far as this organic life is concerned. Thus inner con- formity to an end has also relations to a conformity which is outside. Life can assimilate the means, but they have already been found for it, they have not come into exis- tence through Life itself. Its own organs can produce the life but not the means. We are here iu the region of finite conformity to an end ; absolute conformity we shall get to later on. The teleological way of looking at the world thus con- tains the different forms of the end in general. There are fixed ends and means, and even the end which has the end in itself is merely finite, dependent, standing in need of help in respect to the means. This conformity to an end is so far finite, and finitude in these relations to externality is, to begin with, the means, the material ; the end cannot continue to exist apart from these means, nor, on the other hand, can it exist unless these means are powerless in reference to the end. 3. The next element of truth in this relation of means and end is to be found in that universal Power or Force through which the means potentially exist for the end. From the standpoint of conformity to an end, things which are ends have the power of realising themselves, but they DEFINITE RELIGION 153 have not the power of positing the means. Both the end and the material appear as indifferent to each other, both appear as having an immediate definite existence, the means being something found for the end. Their potentiality, accordingly, is necessarily the power which posits the end, and brings the end, which has its end in itself, into a unity with the means ; and in order that the finitude of the relation may be done away with the finitude being what we have so far been dealing with we must proceed to the point at which the Totality or whole of the process in its inner conformity to an end, comes into view. What is living has ends in itself ; it has means and material within its own existence ; it exists as the power or force of the means and its material. This we find present at first only in the living individual existence. It has in its organs the means, and is there- fore its own material too. These means are pervaded and penetrated by the end, they do not exist indepen- dently for themselves, they cannot exist apart from the soul, apart from the living, unity of the body to which they belong. This fact must now take on the form of what is universal, i.e., the means and materials which appear as accidental forms of existence as contrasted with what the end implicitly is, have actually to be brought under the sway of the Power in them, and to have their soul only in the end, spite of their apparently indifferent independent existence. The universal idea here is Power, which exerts its power in accordance with ends, universal Power. In so far as the end, which is an end in itself, exists, and inorganic Nature is outside of it, this latter as a matter of fact belongs to the Power which shows its power in accordance with ends, so that those forms of existence which appear immediately exist only for the end. There are, it may be said, things which are im- plicitly ends, and things which appear as means, but this characterisation cannot be maintained, for the first men- tioned may in their turn be relatively means, while the 154 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION last mentioned may, on the contrary, exist in a permanent form. This second class, that of those things which appear as existing independently, is implicitly posited, not by means of the Power of the end, but by means of a higher essentially existing Power which conforms them to the end. This is the general conception or notion of Power which acts in accordance with ends. The truth of the world consists in this Power; it is the Power of Wisdom, the absolutely universal Power, and since it is the world which is its manifestation, the truth of the world is the completely realised essential existence of the manifesta- tion of a wise Power. We have now more particularly to consider the proof of the existence of God which is based on this thought. Two points call for notice. The wise Power, namely, is the absolute Process in itself ; it is the power of producing effects, of being active. This wise Power has by its very nature to posit a world which has ends in itself ; its nature is to manifest itself, to pass into actual definite existence. This actual existence is, speaking generally, the positing of the difference, of the manifoldness which attaches to ex- ternal existence. We thus get the element of difference in a more important and more essential specialised form. Power produces what it does produce in its character as wisdom, what is produced is the difference ; this means that the one is implicitly an end and the other a means for the first ; it is merely something in conformity with an end, contingent, and not an end in itself. This dif- ferentiation, namely, that the one is the means of the other, is the one side. The other side in this mediation consists in this, that the mutual relation between these two sides is Power, or, to express it differently, it is just this which characterises those on the one side as ends and the others as means, and is thus the maintenance or preservation of the ends. This aspect of the differentia- tion is Creation ; it proceeds from the Notion ; the wise DEFINITE RELIGION 155 Power produces effects, makes distinctions, and thus is Creation. It is to be noticed that this part of the mediation does not belong to the proof of the existence of God, for this part of the mediation begins with the concep- tion or notion of wise Power. "We have not here as yet reached the point at which the proof starts from the Notion, but that at which it starts from definite existence. I. It is at this point that we first get the conception of Creation strictly so called ; it is not to be found in any of the discussions which have gone before. We had first infinitude, then Power as the Essence of God. In the Infinite we have simply the negative of the finite ; and in the same way in necessity finite existence is something which merely goes back whence it came ; things disappear in it as accidental. What is is only in so far as it is a result. In so far as it is, all that can be asserted of it is only the fact that it is ; nothing can be said of how it is ; it can be in the particular way in which it is, but it might be otherwise as well, right or wrong, happy or unhappy. In necessity we get no further than formal affirmation ; we do not get to the content ; here there is nothing which is abiding, there is nothing which would be an absolute end. It is in Creation that we first come upon the positing and the being posited of affir- mative forms of existence, not only as abstract,